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I. INRODUCTION 
You’ll be sorry that you messed with the USofA, 
‘Cuz we’ll put a boot in your ass, 
It’s the American Way. 
-“Courtesy of the Red, White, & Blue” by Toby Keith 
 
In the post-9/11 world, the United States has the opportunity to send a message to the rest 
of the world.  The message can be either that of Keith’s “American Way,” or of a commitment to 
an ethical and moral approach to extending the norms of civil society.  In the current “war on 
terror,” an unfettered executive has refused to articulate standards and limits for coercive 
interrogation, communicating to the international community a message analogous to Keith’s 
“American Way.”  The United States Supreme Court entered this debate in the case of Hamdan 
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v. Rumsfeld,1 a watershed executive power case.  For this discussion, I argue that Hamdan can be 
viewed as the natural heir to the Bram-Brown progeny thus providing valuable lessons learned 
from the African-American experience in the Deep South to the current detainee interrogations.  
As will be discussed below, the Bram-Brown progeny is a set of cases, originating with Bram v 
U.S., that outline the establishment of protections in the interrogation setting. 
 
Five years after 9/11, there remains a persistent void of adequate standards for the 
interrogation2 of those detained in this “armed conflict short of war.”3 To fill this void, a wide 
spectrum of possible interrogation standards exist, where permitting harsh interrogations or 
torture4 are on one extreme and granting either full Geneva Convention or domestic criminal law 
protections are on the other.  
 
Given the panoply of options between these two extremes, it is necessary to finally and 
precisely delineate a clear set of standards and procedures for detainee interrogations.  The 
continual drum-beat of scholarship focused on torture, 5 while provocative and interesting, forms 
 
1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
2 Defined as the application of force, either physical or mental, in order to extract information.  Coercive 
interrogation can range from mild to extreme, but somewhere along that spectrum coercive interrogation morphs 
into actions more commonly considered to be torture.  Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive 
Interrogation Be Legal? 104 MICH. L. REV. 671 (2006). 
3 The Israeli Government created this term to address the nebulous type of conflict which is not quite war and not 
quite a police action.  See First Statement of the Government of Israel, Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee 
(Dec. 28, 2000), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/FCFDA57E-15AB-4F50-AFBD-
BDCE6A289FA8.htm (last accessed February 5, 2007).  I will be using it in this article to refer to the post 9/11 
conflict. 
4 Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 
1, 2002), in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH (New York Review of Books, 2004). 
5 Alan Dershowitz has been the leading advocate of the so-called “torture-warrant,” whereby a detainee may be 
tortured under court order in severe circumstances.  See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to 
Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 274 (2003-2004). However, this article attempts to move beyond the 
often discussed issue of torture. Furthermore the efforts by the White House in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to 
justify torture were reflective of an illegal policy that can best be described as “groping” and immoral. Similarly, the 
“ticking time bomb” has been cited as justifying an exception to the no-torture rule. The movie “The Siege” portrays 
the dilemma in how to obtain information believed to be required the required for purposes of national security. 
Whether the information was known to the detainee is unclear; what is clear is the absolute violation of his rights.  
See Amos N. Guiora and Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity:  Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, 37 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 427 (Spring 2006); Phillip N.S. Rumney, Is Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects Effective: 
A Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 479; Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275 (Summer 1994); David Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of 
War and Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 61 (Fall 2005); Kenneth J. Levit, The CIA and the Torture Controversy: 
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only a small facet of the interrogation inquiry.  The broader question of what interrogation 
methods will be permissible beyond the cliché “ticking time-bomb” torture discussion is the 
more important issue.   
 
In determining new detainee interrogation standards, I argue that allowing the unfettered 
executive to continue promulgating loosely regulated detainee interrogation standards offends 
civil society, international law, and decreases the likelihood of an international coalition assisting 
the United States in the “war on terror.”  In ascertaining the necessary new limits, I seek to 
examine, and then meld, various aspects of the domestic criminal law paradigm with the prisoner 
of war paradigm in order to create a hybrid.  The criminal law paradigm is defined as “all that is 
involved in the administration of criminal justice, in the broadest sense, 
[embracing]…substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, and special problems in the 
administration and enforcement of criminal justice.” 6 The hybrid paradigm is defined as being 
not a criminal law paradigm or a prisoner of war (“POW”) paradigm, but rather a reflective 
equilibrium between the laws pertaining to domestic criminals and those pertaining to POWs.  
The hybrid paradigm is a melding of these other two models. 7 
In proposing a new analysis of coercive interrogation standards, the conclusions of this 
article are premised upon and necessitate the assumption, at least arguendo, of the hybrid 
paradigm as the most appropriate legal and policy framework for the detention and trial of 
detainees.  In the event that one does not accept the hybrid paradigm, such a conclusion then 
requires that they must either accept that the detainee is entitled to full criminal procedure rights 
 
Interrogation Authorities and Practices in the War on Terror, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 341 (2005); Mirko 
Bagaric and Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World?  The Circumstances in Which Torture is 
Morally Justified, 39 U.S.F.L. REV. 581, (Spring 2005). 
6 Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 1, 5(3d ed. 1982). 
7 Specifically, the hybrid paradigm is “a true mix of both the criminal law and prisoner of war paradigms without 
[either] full Constitutional or criminal procedure rights.” See Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a 
Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 2 (forthcoming 2007); and Amos N. Guiora 
Where are Terrorists to be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected Terrorists, ___  CATH. U. 
L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2007).  However, the establishment of procedures does not imply that the full panoply of 
domestic criminal law rights, such as those articulated in Arizona v Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) be granted to the 
detainees in the trial process. The hybrid paradigm proposes a regime establishing the parameters of criminal law 
rights to be granted the detainees. The hybrid paradigm is comprised of seven policy recommendations that balance 
between the rights of the detainee and the equally legitimate rights of the state. 
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or, on the other hand, that the detainee is to be kept in a black hole in perpetuity.  Although both 
of these interpretations are valid, for the purposes of this paper, the hybrid paradigm operates as 
the proper standard.   
 
The arguments made for superimposing aspects of the criminal law paradigm onto the 
hybrid paradigm are not, however, to be confused with a broader claim that non-citizen detainees 
are inherently entitled to constitutional rights.   Rather, I recommend the application of some 
constitutional protections to detainees as the best way to remedy the deficiencies persistent in the 
current system.  This proposal aims to balance the need to enable interrogations as a means of 
pursuing legitimate national security considerations while also protecting an individual’s interest 
in his own physical autonomy.8
Specifically, this hybrid model will be created by taking various criminal law protections 
that were extended by the Supreme Court to African-Americans in the Deep South throughout 
the last century (a timeframe hereinafter referenced as “Deep South”)9 and superimposing them 
upon the current detainee situation. 
 
This article takes on particular importance in the aftermath of Hamdan v Rumsfeld.10 In 
Hamdan, the Supreme Court signaled to the Bush Administration that the procedures currently 
governing the Guantanamo Bay military commissions11 were inadequate and demanded a 
 
8 See Amos N. Guiora, Transnational Comparative Analysis of Balancing Competing Interests in 
Counterterrorism, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.___ (forthcoming 2006) regarding comparative analysis of 
balancing approaches; Deborah Ramirez and Stephanie Woldenberg, Balancing Security and Liberty in a Post-
September 11th World: The Search for Common Sense in Domestic Counterterrorism Policy, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 495 (2005); and Stephan Dycus, The Role of Military Intelligence in Homeland Security, 64 LA. L. 
REV. 779 (2004).  
9 The term “Deep South” references in particular the region from the late 1800’s through the 1940’s.  In the Deep 
South, the mounting examples of violent interrogations brought the Supreme Court to finally step in and extend the 
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to African-Americans, who were once denied the extension of 
interrogation-based Constitutional protections. 
10 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
11 Recent hearings in the United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary showed the various interpretations of 
the impact of the Hamdan decision, and the response appropriate from the US Senate.  See 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1986 for witness testimony.  House Armed Services Committee Hearing 
on Standards of Military Commissions and Tribunals, July 26, 2006, available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/index.html (last accessed February 5, 2007).  Further, the Institute for 
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reformulation of adequate procedures and processes for the military commissions.12 
Specifically, in discussing the current procedural deficiencies, the Court stated that: 
The commission’s procedures…provide…that an accused and his civilian counsel 
may be excluded from…ever learning what evidence was presented during any 
part of the proceeding…the presiding officer decides to ‘close.’ Grounds for 
closure include the protection of classified information, the physical safety of 
participants and witnesses, the protection of intelligence and law enforcement 
sources, methods, or activities, and ‘other national security interests.’ Appointed 
military defense counsel must be privy to these closed sessions, but may, at the 
presiding officer's discretion, be forbidden to reveal to the client what took place 
therein…Moreover, the accused and his civilian counsel may be denied access to 
classified and other ‘protected information,’ so long as the presiding officer 
concludes that the evidence is “probative.”13 
In further analyzing these deficiencies, the Court held that “even assuming that Hamdan 
is a dangerous individual who would cause great harm or death to innocent civilians given the 
opportunity, the Executive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in 
undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punishment.14”
In response to Hamdan, the United States Congress passed the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006.15 While this Congressional action is a step in the direction of addressing the Court’s 
concerns in Hamdan, it is ultimately insufficient in formulating proper interrogation standards.  
Rather than specifically articulating permissible interrogation methods, the Military 
Commissions Act grants to the Executive the authority to interpret the scope and application of 
Common Article III of the Geneva Convention.  As the discussion to follow shows, the 
establishment of interrogation standards must be done in a clear and specific way so that the 
 
Global Security Law and Policy, of which the author is the Director, is the only law school in the country to provide 
legal memoranda to the United States Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions. 
12 The Court signaled this by stating that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was not a blank check for 
the Administration to set up military commissions however they saw fit, but rather, the AUMF was more like the 
“lowest ebb” of power, akin to Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), requiring further 
Congressional approval for such commissions.  For a seminal article on the role of a Supreme Court in time of 
armed conflict, see Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002) President Barak’s article is the 
clearest articulation of the responsibility, if not obligation, of a Supreme Court to be actively critical and judgmental 
of the executive particularly in war-time. Hamdan reflects that approach; decisions by the Rehnquist Court in the 
aftermath of 9/11 did not reflect that approach philosophical and jurisprudential approach. See also, Amos N. Guiora 
and Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe:  President Barak’s and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Theories of Judicial 
Activism, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 51 (2005). 
13 Hamdan at 2786-2787. 
14 Id. at 2798. 
15 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006). 
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interrogators themselves know the precise contours of permissible interrogation methods.  
However, the evasiveness of the Military Commissions Act leaves itself open to far too many 
“on the battlefield” abuses. 
 
The “Bram-Brown progeny” offers lessons for the extension of some constitutional 
protections common to domestic criminal law would cure the deficiencies identified by the 
Court.  Again, this is not to say that full constitutional protections are to be granted to detainees.  
Rather, the Constitution is used here as a pallet from which to draw rights that have yielded 
success in domestic interrogations.  In the same light as the Bram-Brown progeny symbolized 
the great watershed for implementing and extending existing constitutional protections to 
African-Americans in the interrogation setting,16 Hamdan is a watershed for protecting detainees 
from coercive interrogation.17 
This analysis does require occasional “leaps of faith.”  One such instance acknowledges 
that there are clear differences between the African Americans in the Deep South and the current 
detainees in the “war on terrorism;” in particular, citizenship status and the reasons for 
interrogation.18 However, it is the similarities, not the differences, that are germane to this 
analysis.  The African American experience in the interrogation setting provides a clear frame of 
reference for determining the limits of detainee interrogations despite differences in 
technicalities. 
 
In proceeding with this analysis, this paper focuses on two interrogation methods 
common to domestic criminal law: threats19 and cumulative mistreatment.20 Methodologically, 
 
16 Though Bram was white, the case is critical for the analysis of this paper as it was the Court’s first decision 
regarding the limits of interrogation; Brown is critical as it is the first foray of the Court into the interrogations of 
African-Americans in the interrogation cells of the Deep South. 
17 Just as the cases prior to the Bram-Brown progeny stand for acquiesce by the courts and the government 
regarding the interrogation methods used in the Deep South, so to the decisions of Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004), and Khalid  v Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005), stand for a modern deferential view of executive 
power. 
18 Specifically, the detainees are interrogated for information whereas the African-Americans in the Deep South 
were interrogated/abused out of spite and hatred. 
19 Defined as a communicated intent to inflict harm, either physical or mental, on another person’s body or 
property, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), see infra at Sect. VII. 
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threats and cumulative mistreatment are useful tools as they are both common aspects of 
interrogations widely understood by both laymen and jurists.  Beyond a historical analysis of 
these two interrogation methods, the subsequent jurisprudential analysis will be based on a 
careful examination of scholarship and Supreme Court decisions specifically pertaining to the 5th 
and 14th Amendments.  Using the hybrid model, I propose a set of recommendations for both 
policy makers and decision makers as they seek to establish a legally permissible framework for 
future interrogations.   
 
II: Detainee Rights and Status 
To begin the process of determining which criminal law protections ought to be extended 
to the current detainee interrogations, a critical groundwork must be laid by first discussing who 
the detainees are and secondly, what rights they are currently afforded.  Only then can we 
appropriately move into the discussion of the Bram-Brown progeny.  
 
a) Who are the detainees? 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, numerous commentators, scholars, and policy makers 
sought to define the status and rights of those captured and subsequently detained in Guantanamo 
Bay, Abu Ghraib, Bagram and elsewhere.21 The predominant discussions at that time suggested 
that the detainees22 were to be identified either as prisoners of war,23 entitled to full Geneva 
Convention protections, or as criminals granted rights in accordance with the traditional criminal 
 
20 Defined as continual abuses, or prolonged punishments, of a detainee aimed at wearing down that detainee’s 
will, in an effort to extract information, see infra at Sect. VIII. 
21 See Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 7; Guiora, Where are Terrorists to be Tried, supra note 7;  Elizabeth 
A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edge,” 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 (2006); and Robert M. 
Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The International Law of Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657 (2006). 
22 The traditional argument whether the actors are terrorists, freedom fighters, insurgents or guerillas was much 
discussed post 9/11. The discussion can often turn on whether an individual identified by one as a terrorist is, to 
another, a freedom fighter.  Further, President Bush’s politically driven statement declaring “war on terrorism” 
significantly muddled the waters.  
23 The Geneva Convention defines a POW as a soldier who: 1) is part of a command structure; 2) openly wears his 
insignia; 3) openly carries his arms; and 4) conducts himself according to accepted laws of war. Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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law paradigm.  More than five years after 9/11,24 this discussion remains incomplete and 
unsettled.25 
The matter is complicated by the fact that the detained individuals do not fit either the 
accepted definition of soldiers in a regular army,26 which provides the protections of the Geneva 
Convention, or of common domestic criminals,27 who are entitled to the rights of the tradition 
criminal law paradigm.28 But, it is important to understand the recent developments surrounding 
the Court’s Hamdan decision correctly.  The Court in Hamdan enunciated the need for extending 
certain Geneva Convention protections, yet this ruling should not be read to suggest that 
detainees are “prisoners of war.”  If classified as POWs, international law precludes bringing the 
detainees to trial.29 Therefore, the Hamdan Court’s mandate to extend certain Geneva 
Convention privileges, while still defining them as detainees, enables trials to go forward.30 
24 See Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense England to Department of Defense officials indicating 
that the detainees are in fact covered by the Geneva Convention, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/nationalsecurity/genevaconvdoc.pdf (Last accessed February 5, 2007). 
25 Vague definitions and standards make the determination of the appropriate legal forum for the detainees 
problematic. If they are neither prisoners of war nor criminals, then what are they and to what rights are they 
entitled?  The answer to this inquiry currently finds itself in the “twilight zone” referred to by Justice Jackson in 
Youngstown, as Congress has not explicitly approved or disapproved any specific legal regime.  Youngstown Sheet 
& Tubing Co. v Sawyer, 323 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) Then, Hamdan, supra, it is suggested, will be 
viewed by constitutional law scholars as of the same importance as Youngstown in determining the limits of 
executive power.  See generally Lorell Landis, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old 
Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141, 196-198 (2005); Themes 
Karalis, Foreign Policy and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: Executive Orders Regarding Export 
Administration Act Extension in Times of Lapse of Political Questions, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109 
(2004); David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155 
(2002); and Senator Joseph R. Biden and John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A ‘Joint 
Decision’ Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367 (1988). 
26 See Srividhya Ragavan and Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees from Iraq and Afghanistan 
Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 619 (2005); Omar Akbar, Losing Geneva in Guantanamo Bay, 89 IOWA L. REV. 195 
(2003); and David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions? 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004).  
27 See Tun Yoin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for 
Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149 (2005); Luisa Vierucci, 
Prisoners of War or Protected Persons Qua Unlawful Combatants? The Judicial Safeguards to Which Guantanamo 
Bay Detainees are Entitled, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 284 (2003); MICHAEL RATNER AND ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO:
WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW 184 (2004). 
28 The detained individuals are not able to be classified as soldiers of a regular army due to the lack of central 
command structure and visible insignia, and nor can they be classified as domestic criminals because such a 
classification does not do justice by equating acts of terrorism with common crimes tried in Article III courts. 
29 The appropriate legal forum for the conducting of trials for the detainees will no doubt be much addressed in the 
aftermath of Hamdan, supra. Further, if defined as a prisoner of war, the individual may only be brought to trial on 
charges of either war crimes or violations occurring during detention. 
30 The Geneva Convention defines a POW as a soldier who: 1) is part of a command structure; 2) openly wears his 
insignia; 3) openly carries his arms; and 4) conducts himself according to accepted laws of war (Geneva Convention 
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In moving from the discussion of who these individuals are to what rights they currently 
possess, some scholars have advocated categorizing the detainees simply as criminals,31 applying 
clearly delineated interrogation standards relevant to the criminal law cases.32 But, the 
prevailing view is that the detainees cannot be defined as such, but, again, must be defined under 
some form of prisoner of war or enemy combatant status.33 
A very different legal regime would be in effect today if the Bush Administration had 
responded to the attacks of September 11th by drawing the Hamdan distinction of granting 
certain Geneva Convention protections without extending actual POW status.  In all probability, 
such a regime would have passed judicial scrutiny.  The Court may well have been satisfied with 
 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).  
Accordingly, a soldier who is part of a regular army of a State easily meets this test (In Ex Parte Quirin, the Court 
held that the saboteurs were not soldiers as they had buried their uniforms upon reaching the US and therefore 
equated them to spies. 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942)).  Although it has been argued elsewhere (See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, 
What is an “Unlawful Combatant,” and Why It Matters?, FindLaw, Jan. 23, 2002, available at 
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html) that members of al-Qaeda do in fact belong to an 
organization with a command structure, they unquestionably do not meet the other three parts of the Geneva 
Convention definition. 
31 Jennifer Van Thiel, Good for the Nation, Good for the Administration: Why the Courts Should Hear the 
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Cases and How it Will Have Positive Effects, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 867 (2006) and Tung 
Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061 (2005). 
32 White v State of Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (where the Court held that Due Process precluded a death sentence 
grounded on a confession which resulted from the whipping and beating of a defendant), Brown v State of 
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (where the Court held the confession invalid because, in extracting the 
confessions, the defendants were subject to whippings and hanging), Ashcraft v State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 
(1944) (where the Court held that it was coercive to interrogation the defendant for thirty-six hours without a break), 
Ward v State of Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (where the Court held that admitting the defendant’s confession 
violated his due process rights because the police had moved him from town to town, telling the defendant that mob 
violence was waiting for him at each town), Chambers v Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (where the Court held 
confessions invalid where the defendants were held at length, being interrogated and moved around constantly 
because of false threats of mob violence), Lyons v Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (where the Court held that 
eleven straight days of questioning was improper) and Bram v U.S., 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (where the Court struck 
down the confession because the interrogator had coerced the confession by telling the defendant that there was no 
question remaining as to his guilt, but rather that the only question was how many accomplices there were).  See, 
e.g.,  John F. Blevins, Lyons v Oklahoma, the NAACP, and Coerced Confessions Under the Hughes, Stone, and 
Vinson Courts, 90 VA. L. REV. (2004); Monrad Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN 
L. REV. 411 (1954); Steven Penney, Theories of Confession, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309 (1998); Thomas P. Windom, 
The Writing on the Wall: Miranda’s “Prior Criminal Experience” Exception, 92 VA. L. REV. 327 (2006); William 
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006); and Peter B. Rutledge, The 
Standard of Review for the Voluntariness of a Confession on Direct Appeal in Federal Court, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1311 (1996). 
33 See infra at note 23. 
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the Administration granting “some” rights,34 rather than engaging in the “mental gymnastics” 35 
that characterized the White House memos written in the aftermath of 9/11 in an attempt to 
determine the requisite protections for detainees.36 Five years later and in the aftermath of the 
Hamdan decision, the Administration must finally incorporate these protections.37 
b) Potential Sources of Rights 
 i) The Criminal Law Paradigm 
Providing detainees full rights and procedures, as understood in the traditional criminal 
law paradigm, is both inappropriate and impossible. 38 There are numerous reasons why that is 
so.  An example of the impracticability of adopting the full criminal law paradigm is the 
constitutionally granted right to confront an accuser.  It is clear that in many counterterrorism 
trials there would be significant issues raised with bringing accusers into open court.39 As a 
result, a detainee can never be fully apprised of the case against him.40 But, just because the 
right to confront an accuser may not be logistically possible in terrorism trials, there must still be 
a determination of how to permit as much of this right as possible, without endangering national 
security. This specific dilemma can be remedied by requiring that a confidential source not be 
allowed as the sole basis for a conviction.   
 
34 For articles addressing the issue of what rights are to be extended to the detainees in a trial setting, See Guiora, 
Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 7. 
35 See Guiora and Page, supra note 5. 
36 For discussion of the infighting within the Bush Administration regarding the appropriate procedures, see Tim 
Golden and Don Van Natta, Jr., Threats and Responses: Tough Justice, Administration Officials Split Over Stalled 
Military Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, October 25, 2004; and Kate Zernike, Newly Released Reports Show Early Concern 
on Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, January 6, 2005. 
37 See testimony of Prof. Michael Scharf before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Standards of 
Military Commissions and Tribunals, July 26, 2006, available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/index.html (last visited July 31, 2006).  This, and other similar testimony, 
has lead to the Congressional development of legislation aimed at giving legislative approval to the judicial system 
of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
38 See, e.g., Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 7; Guiora, Where are Terrorists to be Tried, supra note 7; 
Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006); and Richard Raimond, The Role of Indefinite Detention in Antiterrorism 
Legislation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 515 (2006).  
39 Intelligence gathering largely emanates from two sources; HUMINET which is human intelligence and 
SIGNET which is signal intelligence. HUMINET depends on individuals willing to act as sources for a variety of 
reasons. For a fuller description of this, see Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 319 (2004). 
40 According to the 6th Amendment, “the accused shall…be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” 
U.S. Constitution Amendment VI. 
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As a further example, if the domestic criminal law paradigm were adopted in full, the 
prosecution would be required to make all intelligence sources open and available for cross-
examination.41 The overwhelming risk of obligating such sources to appear in open court is 
obvious and significant.42 Modifications, then, would be required to the rules of evidence. 
 
Beyond the sensitive issue of using of classified intelligence information in open court, 
another example of why the full criminal law paradigm cannot be applied is illustrated by the 
fact that under such application, a detainee would have to be “Mirandized” upon arrest on the 
battlefield.  In considering the logistical implications of such a proposition, it is inconceivable 
that an American soldier would read Osama Bin Laden his Miranda rights, as required by the 
Supreme Court in the criminal law paradigm, prior to any interrogation.43 In conjunction with 
these rights, the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence found at the 
scene, presenting significant logistical problems on the battlefield and in counterterrorism trials.   
 
These few examples highlight why the criminal law paradigm should not, and can not, be 
fully applied, but rather it must be intelligently delineated which aspects of the criminal law 
paradigm may actually be applied to the trial of detainees.  In defining detainee status, the first 
conclusion proposed is that the individual is not a criminal in the traditionally accepted and 
understood definition of the word. 
 
ii) The POW Paradigm 
A second relevant paradigm for discerning the detainees’ rights and status is the POW 
paradigm.  According to the Geneva Convention’s four-part test, a POW is a soldier in a State’s 
 
41 Case Western Reserve School of Law and the Institute for Global Security Law and Policy were recently 
awarded $246,807.00 from the United States Department of Justice called “The Professional Education for 
Terrorism Trials Program” for the specific purpose of training federal prosecutors. 
42 See Thomas C. Homburger, Vice Chair of the Anti-Defamation League’s National Commission, Statement of 
Anti-Defamation League and American Jewish Congress B’nai B’rith International, Hadassah, and The Jewish 
Council for Public Affairs to the House Committee on the Judiciary (May 23, 2000), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2000/homburger.html (last accessed February 5, 2007). 
43 I have seen no documentation suggesting that Sadaam Hussein was “Mirandized” upon being taken into 
captivity. 
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army, part of a chain of command, who wears recognizable insignia and conducts himself in 
accordance with the laws of war.44 This paradigm, like the criminal law paradigm, is 
inapplicable in full as the detainees captured on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq do not
meet this four-part test. While perhaps a chain of command exists, the three additional elements 
are not satisfied by the detainees as they wear no clear insignia, do not follow the laws of war,45 
and are not soldiers of any State’s army.46 As the detainees do not fully meet Geneva’s four-part 
test, to designate them as POW's would be inappropriate under international law. 
 
Another reason for the inapplicability, beyond the fact that a POW may not be brought to 
trial unless he has either committed a war crime or a crime during captivity,47 is that a POW 
must be returned to his home country upon the cessation of hostilities.48 Considering the 
difficulty in determining a true beginning of the hostilities associated with the “war on 
terrorism,” the concept of “cessation of hostilities” is incongruous with a conflict of such an on-
going and continuous nature.49 Further, such a classification would impair any opportunity to 
bring these individuals to justice, because, if they were in fact able to be tried and sentenced, 
such a sentence could only last until the “end of hostilities.” 
 
iii) The Hybrid Paradigm of Rights for Detainees  
44 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
45 See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 
AM. J. INT’L L. 580 (2006). 
46 See, e.g., Brett Shumate, New Rules for a New War: The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Al Qaeda 
and Taliban Detainees Captured in Afghanistan, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2005); Rui Wang, Assessing the Bush 
Administration’s Detention Policy for Taliban and Al-Qaeda Combatants at Guantanamo Bay in Light of 
Developing United States case Law and International Humanitarian Law, Including the Geneva Conventions, 22 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413 (2005); and K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive Policy Toward Detention and 
Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 662 (2003). 
47 See Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian and Human Rights 
obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 NO. 3 HUM. RTS BRIEF 6 (2002). 
48 See Major Vaughn A. Ary, Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Cease-Fire Agreements, 148 
MIL. L. REV. 186 (1995). 
49 Terrorism and counter-terrorism, according to most experts, is what can be best defined as a “continuous, low-
intensity conflict” with peaks and valleys (as the summer 2006 “flare-up” of hostilities between Hizzbalah and Israel 
shows).  For discussion on the cessation of hostilities in the war on terrorism, see generally George C. Harris, 
Terrorism, War and Justice: The Concept of the Unlawful Enemy Combatant, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
31 (2003); Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear it, if the Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on the 
Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing or Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (2005); and Rosa Brooks, 
Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 669 (2005). 
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Having identified two paradigms that do not adequately address rights and procedures for 
detainees, the proper standards reside elsewhere.  The hybrid paradigm,50 previously defined as 
“a true mix of both the criminal law and prisoner of war paradigms without [either] full 
Constitutional or criminal procedure rights,”51 reflects the proper balance between the need to 
guarantee the detainee rights in the criminal law setting, while simultaneously ensuring both the 
protection of sources and national security. The hybrid paradigm neither provides or guarantees 
the detainee the full rights of a typical criminal defendant nor throws him into the “dungeons of 
the world.”  This framework offers the proper balance by first recognizing the interests of both 
sides and attempting to preserve the interests of national security by not blindly granting full 
criminal law rights, while also preserving the rights of individuals by attempting to extend 
feasible protections. 
 
In determining the status and rights that attach under the hybrid paradigm, Yale 
Kamisar’s “comparative reprehensibility” test offers a deferential analysis of the amorphous 
middle-ground of this nebulously defined conflict.  As outlined by Kamisar, comparative 
reprehensibility suggests that: 
where the defendant’s conduct is more reprehensible than the police 
officer's (as of course, it usually will be), the 'judges shouldn't soil their 
hands' argument is a good reason for admitting illegally seized evidence. 
For 'judges soil their hands' a good deal more by 'turning a criminal loose 
upon society' than they do by simply ignoring an officer's violation of the 
fourth amendment.52 
50 See Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 7. 
51 Id. 
52 Yale Kamisar, Comparative Reprehensibility and the Fourteenth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1987).  Professor Kamisar further argues that the comparative reprehensibility test can take four possible 
forms: (a) since ‘turning a criminal loose’ is always more shocking, or at least as shocking, as admitting relevant and 
reliable, albeit illegally acquired, evidence, unless there are other good reasons for not doing so, a court should 
always admit such evidence; (b) in ruling on the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth 
amendment, a court should balance the seriousness of the officer's error against the gravity of the defendant's crime 
and only exclude the evidence when, if ever, the reprehensibility of the officer's illegality is greater than the 
defendant’s; (c) the courts should consider some crimes, e.g., murder, rape, and armed robbery, so serious that their 
gravity will always exceed the gravity of any unreasonable search or seizure and completely eliminate these crimes 
from the coverage of the rule, but apply the rule as it normally would be in all remaining cases; and (d) in applying 
the comparative reprehensibility test, a court might take a two-level approach, (i) never excluding illegally seized 
evidence in the ‘most serious’ cases (because the defendant's conduct in such cases will always by more 
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The criminal law paradigm and the prisoner of war paradigm are both insufficient for the 
current conflict.  The questions that arise, and that are central to this discussion, are what 
standards and protections are applied to the hybrid paradigm without being overly deferential to 
either side. 
 
III. Bram, Brown, and Their Progeny 
Based on similarities between the current treatment of detainees and the historic 
treatment of African-Americans arrested in the South, the constitutional standards established by 
the Court53 for the Deep South are applicable and germane to the discussions of the current 
“armed conflict short of war.”54 The starting point for examining the domestic jurisprudence of 
interrogation methods is the “Bram-Brown progeny.”  This progeny55 begins with the Supreme 
Court’s extension of constitutional protections in response to interrogations of African-American 
suspects imprisoned in the Deep South.   
a) Similarities in Treatment of African American in the Deep South and Detainees 
Before discussing the specific contours of the Bram-Brown progeny, it is important to 
more thoroughly discuss the similarities between the African Americans in the Deep South and 
the detainees.  Only by first engaging in this historical examination will the later correlation be 
understood, thereby contributing to practical policy recommendations based on a reading of 
history and an analysis of the law. 
 
In the Deep South,56 those detained by law enforcement officials or whisked away by 
mobs were mainly poor, illiterate African Americans who were subjected to threats, cumulative 
mistreatment and additional interrogation methods that violated Constitutional safeguards. The 
Deep South interrogation methods in many instances were even reminiscent of the Star 
 
reprehensible than the police officer’s), and (ii) freely balancing the gravity of the constitutional violation against the 
gravity of the defendant's crime in other cases. 
53 See infra at Sect. III(c) for discussion of Bram, Brown, White, Ward, White, and Ashcraft.
54 See infra at note 3. 
55 See Infra at note 17. 
56 As referenced earlier to consist of the early to mid-1900’s. 
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Chamber,57 and such treatment continued until the Supreme Court finally mandated the 
extension of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections.  Similarly, the detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay are typically poor, do not speak the language of their surroundings, have little 
or no access to attorneys, and are subject to many threats and abuses from the detaining 
authorities. 
 
As will be shown, in spite of the technical citizenship differences between the African 
Americans, who had historically been held as only 3/5 of a citizen,58 and the detainees who are 
not citizens at all, the similarities between these two unprotected classes are ultimately more 
germane to this analysis than the differences.  Specifically, the African American experience in 
the interrogation cells, in the woods, and in the back seats of the local sheriff’s car, bear an eerie 
resemblance to the experience of the detainee captured in the aftermath of 9/11 and held in 
Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and other “black sites.”59 
There are further differences beyond just citizenship that require acknowledgment before 
moving forward.  First, the detainees are currently being subjected to coercive interrogation not 
simply because of who they are, as was the case for African Americans in the Deep South, but 
they are also interrogated in the pursuit of information.  Secondly, the torture of African 
Americans in the Deep South was due primarily to racism, whereas the current detainees are 
subjected to abuses as they are an “enemy” in a war setting.  Again, though, the similarities in 
treatment and the lessons learned outweigh these differences, as will be shown through the 
following discussion and application.  Further, in light of these acknowledged differences, this 
article does not suggest that the post-Hamdan world inherently requires adopting the Bram-
Brown progeny rules, but rather that the Bram-Brown progeny offers lessons and insight into the 
extension of protections to an unprotected class.    
 
57 The Star Chamber is a term used to describe the room in Westminster Palace where the King of England’s 
council met, because of the star painted on the ceiling of that room.  The court of equity had jurisdiction over 
criminal matters, and as it was intended to be a streamlined alternative to common-law courts, it became a byword 
for unfair judicial proceedings.  See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2704 (2000). 
58 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §2. 
59 That expression has been used to describe detainees held in so-called “black sites” as exposed by Dana Priest, 
CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, November 2, 2005. 
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Just as allegations of rights violated in the early to mid 1900’s lead to the establishment 
of the Wickersham Commission,60 the post 9/11 experience of interrogating detainees has 
yielded numerous allegations of violations of human and civil rights,61 ranging from minor62 to 
major63 which must lead to the development of new and clear standards. 
 
Specifically, in the late 1800’s to the early 1900’s64 African Americans were constant 
victims of lynchings, merciless whippings (with and without the complicity of local law 
enforcement officials), and further mistreatment in the local jails. 65 Further, in the Deep South, 
African Americans were often “rounded-up”66 without evidentiary justification.67 For instance, 
 
60 President Hoover established the commission in response to American public’s increasing worries about crime, 
and a concern about publicity coming from gang wars in Chicago. 
61 See, e.g., U.S. Soldiers Tell of Detainee Abuse in Iraq, Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2006; No Blood, No 
Foul: Soldiers’ Account of Detainee Abuse in Iraq, Human Rights Watch, Volume 18, No. 3(G), July 2006; More 
than 600 Implicated in Detainee Abuse, Human Rights Watch, April 26, 2006; Michelle Voeller-Gleason, Soldier 
Pleads Guilty to Detainee Abuse, Others Face Charges, Army News Service, May 25, 2004; and Steven C. Welsh, 
Detainee Abuse: Abu Ghraib Court Martial: Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick, International Security Law Project, October 
26, 2004 available at http://www.cdi.org/news/law/abu-ghraib-courts-martial-frederick.cfm (last accessed February 
5, 2007).  
62 Including photographs and stress positions. 
63 Including beatings and personal degradation. 
64 Bram was held in 1897 and while the defendant was not an African American it represents the first time the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of the “limits of interrogation.”  The cases subsequently discussed in the paper 
were decided between 1920 and 1940. 
65 For example, there were 3,385 documented mob lynchings of African Americans in the U.S. between 1882 and 
1935.  MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT, THE TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING 
THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM 354-355 (2001).  Further, historian W. Fitzhugh Brundage’s study of 
lynchings in Georgia found that 441 of 460 victims of lynchings between 1880 and 1930 were African Americans.  
See W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 262 (1993). 
66 While the term “round up the usual suspects” was popularized by the movie Casablanca, it is highly relevant 
both to the African American experience as discussed in this article and as evidenced by the number of detainees 
released from Guantanamo it would seem to be equally relevant to those detained in Afghanistan. For instance, of 
the 760 detainees brought to Guantanamo Bay in 2002, the military has released 180 without ever charging any of 
them.  A  report authored by Seaton Hall Law Professor Joshua Denbeaux found that (1) 55% of the detainees are 
not charged with having committed any hostile acts against the United States, (2) Only 8% of the detainees were 
characterized as al Qaeda fighters, and of the remaining detainees, 40% have no definite connect with al Qaeda at 
all, and 18% have no definitive ties with either al Qaeda or the Taliban, (3) the Government has detained numerous 
individuals based merely on affiliations with large groups that are not on the Dept. of Homeland Security watchlist, 
as only 8 % are detained because they were deemed to be “fighters,” and (4) only 5% of the detainees were even 
captured by U.S. forces.  “The government has detained these individuals for more than four years, without a trial or 
judicial hearing, and has had unfettered access to each detainee for that time,” said the report, written by lawyers 
who represent two of the detainees. The lawyers — Mark Denbeaux, a law professor at Seton Hall University in 
New Jersey, and Joshua Denbeaux — were assisted by Seton Hall law students.”  See http://law.shu.edu/ for full 
report (last accessed February 5, 2007). 
67 This is illuminated in countless stories from the early and mid 1800s.  For instance, the 1831 case of Nat Turner 
(see HERBERT APTHEKER, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 119 (1951)), 
involved thousands of slaves acting in rebellion.  In this case there was a uprising in which 60 white men lost their 
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as will be further illuminated and discussed, the accusation by a white woman that an African 
American male had sexually assaulted her, sealed his fate, regardless of proof.  An accusation 
that he was merely “looking” may well have doomed him to “mob rule.”68 
In the same vein, many of the detainees in the ill-defined “war on terror” 69 have been 
detained on a “round up the usual suspects” basis.70 Unfortunately, many of the means used in 
current detainee interrogations are all too similar to the African American experience in the Deep 
South.71 
The 1931 Wickersham Commission Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement72 was 
established by President Herbert Hoover for the specific purpose of examining the veracity of 
 
lives, as did 100 black men.  The white response, indicative of the time, was not to search out the guilty parties for 
trial in the courts, but rather to hang all black men who either participated, or were thought to have participated.  
Further, night riders were organized with police authority to put down any groupings they determined to be secret 
meetings.  JOHN A. DAVIS, BLACK, CRIME, AND AMERICAN CULTURE, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, VOL. 423, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA: 1776-1976 89-98 (1976). 
68 The Scottsboro Case, which has become the paradigm for “black on white” rapes, is a case where the accuser’s 
“whiteness” overrode any consideration of her gender or sexual history.  In 1931, two white women were 
hitchhiking on a train across the state border to find work.  When two police officers entered the car, the women, out 
of fear of being arrested for violating the then in place law prohibiting transporting women across state lines for 
illicit purposes, immediately told the police officers that they had been raped by nine black men, who were all sitting 
in the same train car.  These accusations lead to the quick formation of a mob that was only restrained by the 
promise of a speedy trial.  This ensuing trial ended with quick death sentences, despite the lack of evidence 
regarding any rape.  Even as the case went through appeal, and the women recanted their stories, the local 
population did not believe in the innocence of the nine men.  Further, despite evidence of the women’s involvement 
in prostitution and adultery, one spectator told a reporter that the “victim might be a fallen woman, but by God she is 
a white woman.”  See LISA LINDQUIST DORR, WHITE WOMEN, RAPE, AND THE POWER OF RACE IN VIRGINIA 1900-
1960 (2004). 
69 President Bush’s use of the term “war” reaped unintended consequences.  Although it was no doubt aimed at 
galvanizing the nation, the fact that in international law war can only be between states, he inadvertently promoted 
Al-Qaeda to the level of a state. 
70 See infra at note 66.  
71 The techniques authorized by U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld include: the use of stress positions, isolation, 
hoods over head, removal of comfort items, forced grooming, removal of clothing, and using detainees’ phobias to 
induce stress.  See, e.g., Impunity for the Architects of Illegal Policy, Human Rights Watch, April 2005, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/6.htm (last accessed August 2, 2006).  Further, on December 25, 2002 the 
Washington Post reported that persons held at Bagram were kept kneeling for hours in black hoods as well as being 
deprived of sleep with 24-hour bombardments of lights.  Further, this article quoted one official as saying that “we 
don’t kick the [expletive] out of them, we send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them.” 
72 The “Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement” was one of fourteen reports published by the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, or “The Wickersham Commission.”  For a discussion of the 
Commission’s report, see http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/guides/jurisprudence/wickersham.asp (Last accessed 
July 25, 2006).  President Hoover established the commission in response to American public’s increasing worries 
about crime, and a concern about publicity coming from gang wars in Chicago. 
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numerous reports regarding the conduct of police departments in interrogations throughout the 
United States generally and the Deep South particularly.  In the end, the Commission’s members 
concluded that suspects had been regularly subjected to “the third degree.”73 Specifically, the 
Commission determined that willful infliction of pain on criminal suspects was widespread and 
pervasive.  The Commission further determined that the abusers included not just interrogators, 
but the entire system: police officers, judges, magistrates, and other officials of the criminal 
justice system.  The commission found such violations by examining illegal arrests, bribery, 
coercion of witnesses, fabrication of evidence, and the aforementioned “third degree.”74 
The specific history of African-Americans in southern jails has been well documented 
and the subject of much commentary.75 Furthermore, the “conspiracy of silence”76 among the 
relevant communities contributed to abuses, if not death.  Even more troubling, many lynchings 
were conducted with either the active or passive participation of local law enforcement.77 
In further discussing this necessary history, there are significant similarities between the 
tragic events of the Deep South and abuses in modern day detainee interrogations.  Beyond the 
similarities in interrogation methods used against the African-Americans in the Deep South and 
the current detainees, there is a further poignancy to the similarities.  Specifically, just as African 
Americans in the Deep South often died as a result of the physical mistreatment, such tragedy 
occurs in current detainee interrogations: according to charges filed by the U.S. military against 
Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, Jr., Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush of the Iraqi 
army was killed by Welshofer during the course of an interrogation.78 
73 The Wickersham Commission defines this term as “the use of physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to 
obtain involuntary confessions or admissions.”  National Commission on Law Observances and Enforcement, 
Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931). 
74 Id.
75 See generally John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 539 (2006); Mitchell P. 
Schwartz, Compensating Victims of Police-Fabricated Confessions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119 (Summer 2003); 
Rutledge, supra note 32; and Seth F. Kreimer, “Torture Lite,” “Full Bodied” Torture, and the Insulation of Legal 
Conscience, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 187 (2005). 
76 See Guiora and Page, supra note 12. 
77 See Brundage at 18; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW 
& INEQ. J. 263, 281 (2003); and Muneer I. Ahmad, A RAGE SHARED BY LAW: POST-SEPTEMBER 11 RACIAL 
VIOLENCE AS CRIMES OF PASSION, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1259 (2004). 
78 Chief Warrant Officer Welshofer was ultimately reprimanded in court, but not given jail time for this charge.  
See, e.g.,  No Prison Time for Soldier Held in Iraqi’s Death, New York Times 1/24/2006, Sect: A.  Also, for 
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Further, a Department of Defense report documents additional instances of abuses 
inflicted by U.S. personnel beyond just the well known experiences of Abu Ghraib.79 Major 
General Antonio Taguba’s investigation states the following: 
Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet; 
Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; 
Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for 
photographing; Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping 
them naked for several days at a time; Forcing naked male detainees to 
wear women’s underwear; Forcing groups of male detainees to 
masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped; 
Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them; 
Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, 
and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric 
torture; Writing ‘I am a Rapest’ (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to 
have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing 
him naked; Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck 
and having a female Soldier pose for a picture; A male MP guard having 
sex with a female detainee; Using military working dogs (without 
muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case 
biting and severely injuring a detainee.80 
These examples of many detainees being poorly treated in modern day interrogations further 
indicate the similarities between the detainee treatment and that of African-Americans in the 
Deep South. 
 
instances of more detainee deaths, see Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A1 (detailing the deaths of two Afghan detainees tortured by their Army captors); and 
Tim Golden, Army Faltered in Investigating Detainee Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, at A1. 
79 For discussion of the events of Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, see generally Frank Rich, Supporting Our Troops 
Over a Cliff, N.Y. TIMES June 4, 2006; Carlotta Gall and David Rhode, The Reach of War: The Prisons; Afghan 
Abuse Charges Raise Questions on Authority, N.Y. TIMES, September 17, 2004; Eric Schmitt, The Conflict in Iraq: 
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES September 9, 2004; Eric Schmitt, The Reach of War: Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES July 16, 2004; 
Josh White, Memo Shows Officer’s Shift on Use of Dogs, WASH. POST, April 14, 2006; James W. Smith III, A Few 
Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 671 (2006); John T. Parry, Just for Fun: Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu Gharaib, 1 J. NAT’L.
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 253 (2005).  For a discussion of the historical use of lynchings, see generally: Robert Peltz, 
Contempt of Court, The Turn-of-the-Century Lynching That Launched 100 Years of Federalism, 57 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 221 (2002); William S. McFeely, A Legacy of Slavery and Lynching: The Death Penalty as a Tool of Social 
Control, 21-NOV CHAMPION 30 (1997); and Anne S. Emmanuel, Lynching and the Law in Georgia Circa 1930: A 
Chapter in the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 215 (1996). 
80 See “An open letter to President George W. Bush on the question of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment,” Amnesty International, May 7, 2004, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510782004 (last accessed February 5, 2007). 
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As will be documented below, with respect to the ill-treatment in the Deep South, the 
Supreme Court finally entered the mix.  In a series of monumental decisions, here termed the 
Bram-Brown progeny, predicated on the 5th and 14th Amendments, the Court held that the “Star 
Chamber” was a clear violation of the Constitutional rights of African Americans. The Court 
held that the government must immediately extend constitutional protections and due process to 
the interrogations of African Americans.81 
Just as the Court in the Bram-Brown progeny demanded the extension of procedural 
protections to African American interrogations, the Court in Hamdan similarly articulated to the 
government that the legal regime established in the aftermath of 9/11 must be changed.  
Specifically, the Court in Hamdan, held that the detainees are entitled to Geneva Convention, 
Article III protections, stating that: 
Even if al Qaeda was not signatory of Geneva Conventions, aliens 
captured in connection with United States’ war with al Qaeda [are] 
entitled to protection of article of Geneva Conventions prohibiting ‘the 
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples’; conflict with al Qaeda was a ‘conflict not of an international 
character’ within meaning of article, which afforded some minimal 
protection to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a 
nonsignatory ‘Power’ who were involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of’ 
a signatory.82 
In order to comply with the ruling from Hamdan, requiring the establishment of adequate 
procedures, the government would benefit by looking at the historical extension of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to African-Americans in the Deep South in response to the rulings of 
the Bram-Brown progeny. 
 
b) Origins of the Bram-Brown Progeny 
81 See discussion infra at Sect. III. 
82 Hamdan at 2794. 
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In Bram v US,83 the Supreme Court first entered the interrogation setting.  While the case 
did not involve an African American, the Court’s bright-line rule became central in later race-
based cases.  Here, Bram was accused of committing murder on board an American vessel 
sailing from Boston to South America.84 The ship’s crew overpowered Bram, who was the 
ship’s first officer, and put him in irons until the vessel reached Halifax.85 Upon reaching 
Halifax, Bram was brought to jail and interrogated by a detective from the Halifax Police 
Department.86 
Bram’s subsequent confession led to his conviction for the murder aboard the ship.87 
Bram appealed the conviction, claiming that the confession was coerced.88 In the ensuing 
appeal, the interrogator testified that Bram had confessed fully to the murder without undue 
influence or coercion.89 Bram’s counsel objected, arguing that Bram had been brought to the 
detective’s private office where he was stripped and interrogated.  Under these circumstances, 
the defense counsel argued that “no statement made by the defendant while so held in custody 
and his rights interfered with to the extent described was a free and voluntary statement, and no 
statement as made by him bearing upon this issue was competent.”90 
Although Bram does not illustrate an egregious threat, per se, the Court’s decision to 
reverse Bram’s conviction established a bright line test with respect to threats made during 
interrogation: 
A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has 
been influenced by any threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the 
force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the 
prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence 
has been exerted.91 
83 Bram v U.S., 168 U.S. 532. 
84 Id. at 534. 
85 Id. at 536. 
86 Id. at 537.  Although Bram was brought first to Hallifax, and, at the request of the American consul, 
interrogated by the Hallifax authorities, the American consul eventually requested that Bram be brought to Boston.  
It was in the United States, then, that Bram was formally charged with murder.  
87 Id. at 534. 
88 Id. at 539. 
89 Id. at 538-539. 
90 Id. at 539. 
91 Id. at 543. 
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As the progeny is further developed, it is important to note that the strict Bram test has 
not been overturned.92 Rather, it has been reiterated through its adaptation into a broader test, 
such as the “totality of the circumstances”93 test articulated by the Court in Ashcraft,94 which 
then morphed into the “shocks the conscience” test95 for determining whether an interrogation 
violated a suspect’s 5th and 14th Amendments rights.96 
92 See Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confessions: Lessons of Slavery, 49 HOW. L.J. 31 (2005); 
Marvin Zalman, The Coming Paradigm Shift on Miranda: The Impact of Chavez v Martinez, 39 NO. 3 CRIM. LAW 
BULLETIN 4 (2003); and Mark A. Goodsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The International 
Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators From Non-Americans Abroad, 91 
GEO. L.J. 851 (2003). 
93 See generally U.S. v  Etchison, 2005 WL 3088343 (Police interrogation of a suspect in custody threatens the 
Fifth Amendment where officers compel confessions through coercive interrogation or exposure to “inherently 
coercive” environments created by custodial interrogation.); State v Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18 (Kansas 2005) (Police 
officers’ threats during interrogation to tell county attorney of defendant's lack of cooperation was inconsistent with 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination but did not render his confession involuntary per se.); 
Riley v Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997) (while a pretrial detainee was painfully tightly handcuffed, an officer 
inserted a pen into a pretrial detainee's nose and threatened to rip it open. The officer also slapped the detainee, 
causing his head to snap to one side and raising welts on his face. The detainee subsequently suffered depression and 
nightmares. The court found these injuries to be no more than de minimus, necessitating judicial action); Taylor  v. 
McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1998) (while attempting to remove a driver’s license from a pretrial detainee’s 
mouth, an officer “placed his knee in the lower part of [plaintiff's] back and at the same time grabbed [plaintiff] by 
the head and started pulling his head backwards until his back popped.”  The detainee also claimed that the officer 
“shoved a small wooden object into [the detainee’s] nose with such force that it caused his nose to hemorrhage and 
then shoved it into [the detainee’s] mouth.”  The court found the injuries to be de minimus at most.  The Court held 
that there are only two exceptions to the rule that plaintiff's injuries must be more than de minimus to sustain a claim 
of excessive force. The first is under extraordinary circumstances where the officer's conduct is "repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind. The second exception from the rule requiring more than de minimus injury is under a claim 
of excessive force employed during interrogation); Gray v Spillman, 925 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1991) (the pretrial 
detainee was tightly handcuffed, which caused swelling and injury to his right hand; kicked in the foot, which 
caused severe pain and swelling; and shoved up against a wall, which injured his lip and loosened three of his front 
teeth.  The court held that even if these injuries were de minimus, in the context of interrogation, a plaintiff has only 
to prove the use of any physical force to coerce an incriminating statement.); Bartram v Wolfe, 152 F.Supp.2d 898 
(S.D.W.Va. 2001)) (Beating and threatening a person in the course of custodial interrogation violates the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.). 
94 Ashcraft v State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).  Later, in Arizona v Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), 
where the Court held a jailhouse confession to have been coerced because defendant confessed to a government, 
agent who was posing as a fellow prisoner, who offered to protect defendant from jailhouse violence in exchange for 
the truth for instance, the Court wrote: “[w]e deal first with the State’s contention that the court below erred in 
holding Fulminante’s confession to have been coerced. The State argues [under Schneckloth] that it is the totality of 
the circumstances that determines whether Fulminante’s confession was coerced, but contends that rather than apply 
this standard, the Arizona court applied a ‘but for’ test, under which the court found that but for the promise given 
by Sarivola, Fulminante would not have confessed.  In support of this argument, the State points to the Arizona 
court’s reference to Bram v. United States.  Although the Court noted in Bram that a confession cannot be obtained 
by ‘any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence,’ it is clear that 
this passage from Bram, which under current precedent does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness 
of a confession, was not relied on by the Arizona court in reaching its conclusion.” Id. at 285. 
95 Edward L. Fiandach, Miranda Revisited, 29-NOV CHAMPION 22 (2005) (“With Brown establishing the outer 
parameter of what would commonly be known as the Due Process voluntariness test, the next two decades would 
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Bram’s bright-line rule specifically acknowledged not only the applicability of the Fifth 
Amendment, but also that “there can be no doubt that long prior to our independence the doctrine 
that one accused of crime could not be compelled to testify against himself had reached its full 
development in the common law…as resting on the law of nature, and was imbedded in that 
system as one of its great and distinguishing attributes.”97 The next major development of the 
progeny was the extension of the Bram rule to the police departments of the Deep South. 
 
The following cases represent the core of the Supreme Court’s specific intervention in the 
interrogations of African-American suspects mandating the application of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments.98 The decisions here reflect an understanding that the interrogation methods of the 
Deep South were a fundamental violation of the Constitution. 
 
c) Jurisprudence of the Bram-Brown Progeny 
see the Court move closer to the rationale of Bram.  In so doing, the Court’s focus would inexorably shift from an 
examination of the statement’s truthfulness to the motivation to make the statement and whether the decision to 
testify against one's self was “free and voluntary.”); David Aram Kaiser, United States v. Coon: The of Detrimental 
Reliance for Plea Agreements?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (2001) (“While Bram was decided before Brown and its 
progeny, for the middle third of the 20th century [the Court] based the rule against admitting coerced confessions 
primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. [The Court] applied the due process voluntariness test in 
some 30 different cases decided during the era that intervened between Brown and Escobedo v. Illinois.”); and 
MaryAnn Fenicato, Miranda Upheld by U.S. Supreme Court, 2 NO. 19 LAWYERS J. 2 (2000) (“Although Bram 
preceded Brown , the latter prevailed because the Fifth Amendment was not considered incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applicable to the states until 1964. Thus, the due process test was utilized in 
approximately thirty different cases thereafter, and continually refined into an inquiry examining whether a 
defendant's will was overborne by ‘weighing the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the 
person confessing.’”). 
96 In applying the 14th Amendment to the criminal law interrogation setting, the Supreme Court has addressed the 
core issues of voluntary confessions and the totality of the circumstances.  What the Court referred to in Rochin v 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), as “shocks the conscience” is the test for determining whether an interrogation 
violated the 5th and 14th Amendments.  This test stands for the proposition that the police cannot procure evidence 
from for a criminal prosecution in a particularly offensive manner (in Rochin, the methods objected to included a 
forced stomach pump looking for drugs in the defendant’s stomach). 
97 Bram at 545. 
98 Whether the Court could have intervened earlier is for scholars to debate; that being said I have argued 
elsewhere that judicial review in armed conflict must be active and immediate.  See, e.g., Guiora and Page, supra 
note 12.  The judicial review philosophy advocated in the article is based on the Israeli model as espoused by the 
former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak. See Barak, supra note 12. 
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The Supreme Court’s initial Deep South interrogation case was Brown v U.S.99 Brown 
specifically presents the question of whether convictions, based solely on confessions that are 
shown to have been extorted by State officers through brutality and violence, are consistent with 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirement.100 The holding in Brown is of particular 
importance because the “due process doctrine for police interrogations began its life with the 
Court’s dramatic creation of a Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary rule in Brown.”101 
The petitioners in Brown, all African-Americans, were convicted for the murder of a 
white man.  The petitioners were arrested, indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death 
within exactly one week.102 Specifically, upon the discovery of a dead body, the local sheriffs 
went to the home of one of the petitioners.  The sheriff asked the petitioner to accompany him to 
the house of the deceased where, unbeknown to the petitioner, a mob of white men had gathered 
to accuse him of the crime.  Upon the petitioner’s denial, the mob seized him, with the sheriff’s 
assistance, and hung him by a rope.103 The mob then let the petitioner down before re-hanging 
him a second time.104 
This process continued while Brown repeatedly protested his innocence.105 The mob 
then tied the petitioner to a tree and whipped him as he consistently denied the accusations.106 At 
this point, the mob finally released Brown, and he managed to stagger home, despite the severe 
abuse he had just endured.107 Other suspects were then brought to the jailhouse where they were 
made to strip and lay over chairs while their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap 
containing buckles.108 It was made clear to the victims that the whippings would continue unless 
and until they confessed.109 
99 Brown v U.S., 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
100 Id. at 279. 
101 Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2203 (1996). 
102 Brown at 279. 
103 Id. at 281. 
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 282. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.
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After a few days, the sheriff returned to Brown’s home to arrest him yet again.  In the 
process of taking Brown to jail in the adjoining county, the sheriff stopped and severely whipped 
him, threatening that he would continue the whipping until the defendant confessed.110 At this 
point, Brown finally acceded to the demands, and confessed.111 Nevertheless, the whippings 
continued until the confession’s specific language was in accordance with that desired by the 
officers.112 
The Court in Brown held that the trial court should have disallowed the confessions 
because of the brutality used to procure them.  Specifically, the Court used the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach: 
There was thus enough before the court when these confessions were first 
offered to make known to the court that they were not, beyond all 
reasonable doubt, free and voluntary; and the failure of the court then to 
exclude the confessions is sufficient to reverse the judgment, under every 
rule of procedure that has heretofore been prescribed, and hence it was 
not necessary subsequently to renew the objections by motion or 
otherwise.113 
In these two watershed cases, Bram and Brown, the extension of protections was achieved 
through the use of two different and important constitutional principles: the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination was articulated in Bram, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause was articulated in Brown.114 
Explaining and applying the Bram-Brown progeny, the following cases further depict 
circumstances in the Deep South for African Americans enabling us to draw conclusions 
pertinent to detainee interrogation.  In discussing the following specific cases, they were not only 
chosen for their showing of the progressive application of the 5th and 14th Amendments to 
 
110 Id.
111 Id. 280-282. 
112 Id. at 282. 
113 Id. at 463. 
114 See generally Fenicato, supra note 95.  Referring to Brown, Laura Magid, commented that “[i]n 1936…with 
Brown v. Mississippi, the Court turned to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for 
examining the voluntariness of confessions in dozens of state cases.  The Court held that police use of violence was 
‘revolting to the sense of justice,’ stating that ‘[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness 
stand.’” Laura Magid, Deceptive Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1172 
(2001). 
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African-Americans, but also for the similarities they show to current detainee treatment.  
Specifically, these cases were chosen because each one of them shows the violent nature of 
interrogations in the Deep South, which is the primary tenant of the comparison effectuated 
herein to the interrogations of detainees. 
 
In White v Texas, 115 the defendant, a black farmhand working on a plantation outside of 
Livingston, Texas, was convicted of rape and subsequently sentenced to death.116 The defendant 
was called in from the field while picking cotton to go to the brother of the prosecutrix “where 
fifteen or sixteen negroes of the vicinity were at the time in custody without warrants or the 
filing of charges.”117 White was then taken to a local jail where each night armed officers took 
him into the woods, asked him to confess, whipped him, and warned him not to tell anyone what 
transpired.118 
The defendant, who was illiterate, eventually signed a written confession.119 While the 
officer who was identified by petitioner as the individual who whipped him nightly in the woods 
denied doing so, he did not specifically deny taking the petitioner into the woods to be 
interrogated.120 In reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Court held that “due process of law, 
preserved for all by our Constitution, commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this 
record shall send any accused to his death.”121 
Furthering this legacy in the Deep South, the defendant in Ward v Texas, 122 a black man 
accused of killing a white man, appealed his murder conviction, arguing that it was based on a 
coerced confession.  Upon arrest, the police told the defendant that mobs of white men were 
waiting for him in various towns.123 Based on the supposed presence of these mobs, the police 
 
115 White v Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940). 
116 Id. at 530. 
117 Id. at 532. 
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 533. 
121 Id., citing Chambers v Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
122 Ward v Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942). 
123 Id. at 548. 
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took the defendant from town to town under the cover of night, not allowing him to sleep.124 
Further, the defendant contended that he only offered a confession after “he had been arrested 
without a warrant, taken from his home town, driven for three days from county to county, 
placed in a jail more than 100 miles from his home, questioned continuously, and beaten, 
whipped and burned by the officer to whom the confession was finally made.”125 
The Ward Court held that accepting the defendant’s confession into evidence was a 
denial of his due process rights because of the cumulative mistreatment to which he was 
subjected.126 Specifically, the Court spoke of “cumulative mistreatment”127 when it indicated 
that: 
The effect of moving an ignorant negro by night and day to strange 
towns, telling him of threats of mob violence, and questioning him 
continuously is evident from petitioner’s statement to County Attorney 
Rolston that he would be glad to make any statement that Rolston desired. 
Disregarding petitioner’s claims that he was whipped and burned, we 
must conclude that this confession was not free and voluntary but was the 
product of coercion and duress, that petitioner was no longer able freely 
to admit or to deny or to refuse to answer, and that he was willing to 
make any statement that the officers wanted him to make. 
 
This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions extorted 
from ignorant persons who have been subjected to persistent and 
protracted questioning, or who have been threatened with mob violence, 
or who have been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of 
friends or counsel, or who have been taken at night to lonely and isolated 
places for questioning.  Any one of these grounds would be sufficient 
cause for reversal. All of them are to be found in this case.128 
Moving forward, in 1944, the petitioners in Ashcraft v Tennessee129 claimed that their 
convictions had been improperly extorted by law enforcement officials.130 The defendants were 
 
124 Id. at 549. 
125 Id. 
126 See infra at Sect. VIII for definition. 
127 Finding cumulative mistreatment requires a case by case analysis where the court must focus on particular 
circumstances, such as the amount of movement, specific length of time, number of people, gender, to make a 
determination of when the “continuousness” breaks the individual’s will.  
128 Ward at 555. 
129 Ashcraft v Tennessee 322 US 143 (1944). 
130 Id. at 145. 
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questioned continuously for more than 36 hours by a relay of police officers.131 In reversing the 
convictions, the Ashcraft Court held that, under the “totality of the circumstances” test, the 
confessions were compelled through cumulative mistreatment.132 
As previously indicated, the question in Bram was whether the defendant had been 
compelled or coerced to make a self-incriminatory statement contrary to the 5th Amendment.  
The question in Ashcraft, furthering the approach from Brown, was whether the defendant’s 14th 
Amendment privileges were violated when he was coerced to confess.133 
The particular importance of Ashcraft is its factual distinction from the previous cases in 
that the conviction was overturned not because of physical abuse, but rather, on the grounds of 
cumulative mistreatment, as “it appears that Ashcraft from Saturday evening at seven o’clock 
until Monday morning at approximately nine-thirty never left this homicide room of the fifth 
floor.”134 
The Ashcraft dissent, though, raises concerns that the majority’s position may be 
construed to mean that any lengthy interrogation is “inherently coercive.”135 The dissent argues 
that while confessions resulting from a lengthy interrogation should be held as prima facie 
involuntary, there still needs to be a focus on the actual coerciveness of the interrogation.136 
The Bram-Brown progeny’s litany of violent and coercive interrogations serves to typify 
the treatment of African Americans in the Deep South.  African Americans were arrested based 
on a vague inkling of guilt, subjected to threats of violence, and physically tortured to induce 
confessions.  The above discussion provides a poignant lesson for the discussion of rights to be 
extended to detainees.  In each of these cases, the Court took great measures to demand that 
 
131 Id. at 153. 
132 Id.
133 Id. at 148. 
134 Id. at 149. 
135 Id. at 157. 
136 Id.
Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot? 
29
these constitutionally unprotected citizens receive many constitutional protections afforded to 
white society. 
 
d) Applying the Deep South to the Detainees 
 The above selected cases of the Bram-Brown progeny highlight conduct that is similar to 
that of the current detainees.  The detainees currently held by the United States, similar to the 
African Americans in the above progeny, have, in many instances, been rounded up and detained 
based on vague and unarticulated suspicion of guilt, subjected to violent and degrading 
interrogations, and held until their will is broken, often times leading to untrustworthy 
confessions and intelligence.   
 
The importance of the above discussion is not the specific criminal law aspects, as the 
detainees are under the hybrid paradigm, but rather the lessons of interrogation methods that 
were held by the United States Supreme Court to be beyond those which are permissible to be 
carried out at the hands of American law enforcement.  With the above facts and discussion in 
hand, this article will next turn to the Constitutional debate of extending Constitutional 
protections to non-citizens. 
 
In addition, to this discussion of “how” to extend such protections, the preceding question 
of “why” must always be kept in mind.  In short, as stated earlier, a regime of protection needs to 
be extended because of the abuses which have occurred over the years since 9/11, most notably 
in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.  These abuses are direct results of a system that was 
hesitant to draw lines in the sand, instead favoring illusive and undefined standards.  Further, it 
must be kept in mind that applying these Deep South principles to detainees is not done in a 
veiled attempt to coerce the other side to act in the same way towards American prisoners, as 
such is highly unlikely, but rather such an extension of protections comports with the moral duty 
that is enshrined in the United States.  Then, accepting this need for extending protections, the 
next issue to address is extending Constitutional protections to aliens. 
 
IV. Extending Constitutional Protections to Aliens  
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As alluded to earlier, the proposed analysis grounds itself on accepting the argument for 
extending constitutional protections to both American citizens as well as non-citizens held by the 
United States.137 The acceptance of the argument that constitutional protections may be 
extended to non-citizens is critical to the analysis contained in this article, as the detainees 
currently held in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere are clearly not American citizens.138 
In light of the discussion of who the detainees are, from what paradigms of rights to draw 
on for protections, and the Court’s dealings with the historic example of the interrogations in the 
Deep South, it is appropriate now to analyze the more general question of extending 
constitutional protections to the detainees as non-citizens, a currently unprotected class.  As was 
shown earlier, the Hamdan Court mandates the extension of protections to detainees, but for the 
comparison being made in this article, it remains to be delineated how to cross the gap between 
the fact that African Americans were considered partially citizens, and the detainees’ are wholly 
aliens. 
 
An initial issue is why constitutional rights should be extended to non-citizens in the first 
place.  David Cole argues that any alien, legal or illegal, residing in the US is entitled to full 
constitutional guarantees and protections.139 According to Cole: 
As politically tempting as the trade-off of immigrants’ liberties for our 
security may appear, we should not make it. As a matter of principle, the 
rights that we have selectively denied to immigrants are not reserved for 
citizens.  The rights of political freedom, due process, and equal 
protection belong to every person subject to United States legal 
obligations, irrespective of citizenship.140 
137 See infra at Sect. I. 
138 The exceptions are Hamdi, who was initially held in Guantanamo Bay and transferred to a naval brig in South 
Carolina when his claim of American citizenship was verified.  Hamdi was then released to the care of his father in 
Saudi Arabia.  John Lindh Walker, then, was captured in Afghanistan was, tried and convicted in U.S. District 
Court.  Further, Jose Padilla (the so-called “dirty bomber”) was declared by then Attorney General Ashcroft to be 
“one of the most dangerous terrorists alive” and was the subject of numerous lawsuits regarding his habeas corpus 
will be tried in federal court in Miami on a series of lesser charges. Mr. Ashcroft’s comments bear repeating only in 
that they represent a disturbing trend in the Bush Administration’s initial legal responses to 9/11.  See Ediberto 
Roman, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 559-560 (2006). Hamdan is thus the culmination of 
grave concern regarding the executive branches’ “over-reaching.” 
139 DAVID COLE AND JAMES DEMPSEY, IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM (2003). 
140 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002). 
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To discuss extending Constitutional protections to non-citizens, it should be first noted 
that the origins of this question began in the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision, holding that 
the Fifth Amendment was not limited to the geographic boundaries of the states, but rather such 
protections were extended to all incorporated territories of the United States.141 In the 150 years 
since Dred Scott, the Court has discussed similar cases with two distinct “lines of demarcation” 
important for determining detainee rights: first, distinguishing between individuals within and 
outside of the United States, and secondly distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens.   
 
In discussing these two issues, case law slowly extended Constitutional protections to 
include non-citizens, provided cognizable ties to the United States could be demonstrated.  The 
clearest tie was physical location within the border of the United States.142 Thus, as will be seen 
in the discussion of Eisentrager,143 this specific inquiry directly impacts this article’s question as 
the decision of Guantanamo Bay’s status as a territory of the United States is of the utmost 
importance.  If Guantanamo Bay is held as a territory of the United States, then the precedent 
dictates that fundamental rights, like the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, should apply.  But, 
if not held to be a territory, then the Constitutional protections would not necessarily be 
afforded.144 
141 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
142 U.S. v Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (D. Berlin 1979). 
143 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  In Eisentrager, petitioner sought habeas corpus review as a 
German national in the custody of the United States Army.  The Supreme Court held that the German nationals who 
were being held based on a military commission conviction for having engaged in military activity against the 
United States, possessed no right to a habeas corpus petition. 
144 The historical litany of this distinction began in 1891 with the case of In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).  In 
Ross, an American seaman was suspected of murder on an American ship in Japan.  The defendant then was tried 
and convicted by a consular court in Japan, appealed based on a Fifth Amendment claim, and the Supreme Court 
denied the appeal because the trial took place outside of the United States, and thus the Fifth Amendment did not 
apply.  In that case the Court acknowledged that it was a valid question to inquire whether the person asserting 
constitutional protection was inside or outside of the United States.  This line of cases continued, then, with the 
“Insular Cases” running from 1901-1922.  Specifically, cases considered to be within the progeny of the “Insular 
Cases” dealt with the land acquired by the United States during the Spanish-American War.  This was, for the first 
time, where the Court noted that some constitutional rights could be extended out to U.S. territories, but only some 
rights would be here extended, as the territory was not fully incorporated.  See Downes v Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901). 
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For the second distinction the Court looked to the applicability of Constitutional 
protections to citizens, no matter where they were physically located.  As noted above,145 the 
Constitution did not initially have any reach beyond the territorial boundary of the United States.  
However, although the “Insular Cases”146 began the process of expanding such a holding 
generally, they did not specifically touch on the question for non-citizens.  Specifically, the 
“Insular Cases” achieved four effects relevant to this distinction: (1) they offered explicit legal 
justification of American endeavors in Puerto Rico; (2) the cases created a system by which 
America, as a State, could exert power over a foreign entity; (3) they defined the “legitimate” 
framework for later political struggles relating to the issue of the political status of Puerto Rico 
and the grating of legal and political rights to Puerto Ricans; and (4) they created a framework 
that facilitated the establishment of practices which recognized, and validated, the colonial 
project in Puerto Rico.147 
As the Court further developed this second distinction, the question of citizenship, it 
increasingly held that citizens “carry” their constitutional rights outside of the territory of the 
United States.  In 1990, the Court held in Verdugo-Urquidez148 that the Fifth Amendment, in 
particular, applied to any “person” or “accused” as opposed to the more restrictive Fourth 
Amendment protection of “the people.”149 
In the aftermath of the aforementioned Dred Scott decision, which expanded 
constitutional protections, the Eisentrager Court noted a slow and steady progression of an 
increase in rights to be granted to aliens.150 In noting this progressive trend, the Eisentrager 
145 See infra at note 144. 
146 The “Insular Cases” are nine cases addressing the constitutional questions of the status of Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines in 1901.  The Insular Cases also include a series of cases from DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.1 (1901) to 
Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
147 See generally, Sanford Levinson, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: Why the Canon Should be Expanded to 
Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000). 
148 U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990). 
149 Moving forward momentarily, the current Congressional immigration debates enable further analysis.  In the 
immigration context, illegal immigrants working in the United States are subjected to the aspects of the Constitution 
which benefit the government, such as taxation.  Thus, the argument can be made that if the government is going to 
apply Constitutional guarantees when beneficial to its interests, then Constitutional protections, as discussed later in 
this article, must be extended. 
150 Eisentrager at 766. 
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Court held that physical presence alone in the country creates an implied guarantee of certain 
rights, which become even more extensive when an active statement of intent to become a citizen 
is made.151 Specifically, the Court noted that “in extending constitutional protections beyond the 
citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien’s presence within its 
territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act.”152 
Applying these principles to the discussion of Guantanamo detainees, the court in Khalid 
v Bush153 held that Guantanamo Bay detainees do not possess any cognizable rights because, the 
district court noted, non-citizens detained by the United States beyond the domestic borders (as 
the court argued to be the case with Guantanamo Bay) cannot avail themselves of constitutional 
protections.  Rasul v Bush,154 then, offers a more appropriate frame of reference on the question 
of the interplay between the decisions of Guantanamo’s territorial status and the proper extension 
of constitutional protections.  Rasul stands for the proposition that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to hear a detainee’s habeas petition whenever they are held in a place where the 
“United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control.”155 
In further arguing for constitutional protections for detainees, the In re Guantanamo 
Detainees156 court cited Rasul as recognizing the precedent from Eisentrager barring claims of 
an alien seeking to enforce the U.S. Constitution in a habeas proceeding outside of a sovereign 
territory of the United States.157 However, the In re Guantanamo Detainees court held that the 
Eisentrager decision which denied German detainees constitutional rights, was inapplicable to 
the Guantanamo detainees because the detainees, unlike the Germans, “have been imprisoned in 
territory over which the U.S. exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.”158 
151 Id. at 771. 
152 Id.
153 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (foreign nationals captured on the battlefield and brought 
to Guantanamo Bay filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus). 
154 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 467 (2004). 
155 Id. 
156 In re Guantanamo Detainees, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 453-454 (D.D.C. 2005). 
157 Id. at 449. 
158 Id. at 476.  The German detainees were held and tried by the United States Army in the “China Theatre.”  
However, upon their convictions they were sent to Germany to serve their sentences.  Eisentrager at 766. 
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Thus, pertaining to the question at hand, in light of the jurisprudence of the Eisentrager 
decision, the appropriate holding turns on the territorial status of Guantanamo Bay.  Guantanamo 
detainees must be granted constitutional protections if Guantanamo Bay is accepted as a territory 
of the United States. 
 
The discussion regarding the applicability of constitutional rights to the detainees must 
first be grounded upon the understanding that, although we are not talking about “legal aliens,” 
we are also not talking about “illegal aliens,” as the term is commonly understood.159 Rather, 
this discussion involves a third class of aliens: the detainees.  This class of individuals was 
brought within the jurisdiction of the United States, specifically to Guantanamo Bay, which the 
above discussion showed was held to be tantamount to U.S. soil, against their will by U.S. 
soldiers acting upon the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.160 
Thus, this brief discussion highlights the permissibility of extending constitutional 
protections to non-citizens.  Specifically, given the sufficient connection between the detainees 
and the United States, particularly being on American soil and being on such soil because of U.S. 
authorities, the detainees may not be inherently entitled to full constitutional protections, but they 
certainly deserve certain constitutional protections in order to preserve the interests of civil 
society. 
 
V. Analysis of the 5th and 14th Amendments in the Context of Interrogations 
a) The 5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination 
The protections of the 5th and 14th Amendment are inextricably tied to the interrogation 
setting of the domestic criminal law paradigm.  The 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
 
159 This term usually refers to individuals who have illegally crossed our borders in an effort to get around the 
lengthy immigration process. 
160 See generally, Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatans, Aliens and the Constitutional 
Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2004); Valerie L. Barth, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the 
Role of the Judiciary: A Proposal for Heightened Review of Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
105 (1997); and Wendy R. St. Charles, Recognizing Constitutional Rights of Excludable Aliens: The Ninth Circuit 
Goes Out on a Limb to Free the “Flying Dutchman,” 4 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 145 (1995). 
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specifically protects an individual from being forced to incriminate himself.161 For this article, 
the ultimate question regarding the Fifth Amendment is whether the right against self-
incrimination should be extended to detainees.  The further question under the 5th Amendment, 
whether an individual arrested in the “zone of combat”162 should be read his Miranda rights, is 
likely answered in the negative for its impracticality, yet it remains open whether such rights and 
protections should be granted to the detainee once he is in the interrogation setting.163 
In analyzing the Bram-Brown progeny, it is clear that the Supreme Court extended the 
Fifth Amendment in general to the indigent, illiterate African Americans in the jailhouses of the 
Deep South. As noted above, in the aftermath of Hamdan this right needs to, at least partially, be 
extended to the detainees as well.164 Although never directly addressing the detainees’ privilege 
regarding self-incrimination, the Hamdan Court’s opinion offers a scathing criticism of the 
military commissions as a whole, thus incorporating the lack of 5th Amendment protections into 
its criticism.  The Bush Administration would clearly disagree with any such proposition given 
its previous indication that “it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order 
 
161 Specifically, “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. CONST.
amend. V.  Scholars and Supreme Court cases alike have analyzed the significance of this right in various contexts: 
For scholarship discussing the Fifth Amendment in relation to police interrogation methods, see generally Alexander 
J. Wilson, Defining Interrogation Under the Confrontation Clause After Crawford v Washington, 39 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 257 (2005); Paul G. Alvarez, Taking Back Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Can Keep “Question-
First” and “Outside Miranda” Interrogation Methods in Check, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1195 (2005); and Russell D. 
Covey, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867 (2005).  For scholarship discussing the Fifth Amendment 
in relation to court testimony, see H. Mitchell Caldwell and Carlo Spiga, Crippling the Defense of an Accused: The 
Constitutionality of the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Testify, 6 WYO. L. REV. 87 (2006). For scholarship discussing 
the Fifth Amendment in relation to confessions, see generally Eric English, You Have the Right to Remain Silent, 
Now Please Repeat Your Confession: Missouri v Seibert and the Court’s Attempt to Put and End to the Question-
First Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 423 (2006) and Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71 
(2006). 
162 This is a much used, perhaps misused and misunderstood, term of art.  In traditional warfare, the zone of 
combat was where armies faced each other: infantry and armored corps units on the battleground; air forces in the 
air and navies on the high sea. In “armed conflict short of war,” the zone of combat has been significantly expanded 
to include the civilian population and urban residential areas. The training of the soldier for the zone of combat is 
significantly different than for traditional warfare. 
163 See, e.g., Rinat Kitai, A Custodial Suspect’s Right to the Assistance of Counsel: The Ambivalence of the Israeli 
Law Against the Backdrop of American Law, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 205 (2004); Sean D. Murphy, Executive Branch 
Memoranda on Status and Permissible Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 820 (2004); and Jonathan F. 
Lenzner, From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal Courthouse: A Confession’s Uncertain Journey in the U.S.-
Led War on Terror, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 297 (2004). 
164 See Bob Herbert, The Definition of Tyranny, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006; Adam Liptak, Scholars Agree That 
Congress Could Reject Commissions, but Not That It Should, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006; Kate Zernike and Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg, Detainee Rights Create a Divide on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES July 10, 2006; Rosa Brooks, Orwell 
Has Nothing on This White House, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2006. 
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the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases 
in the United States district courts.”165 
While it can be argued that a detainee may possess intelligence information of operational 
importance, making a discussion of self-incrimination moot for the lack of information ever 
going to open court, as noted through the above discussion of Bram, the Supreme Court has 
linked the 5th Amendment’s protections against self-incrimination to general limitations of 
acceptable interrogation methods.  In addressing the question of the extension of 5th Amendment 
rights to non-citizens, courts and scholars have often wrestled on exactly this question. 
 
For instance, in the recent immigration decision Zadvydas v. Davis,166 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the tradition of applying due process to aliens present within the United States, 
regardless of their legal status.167 Specifically, the Court held that the 5th Amendment is 
incongruent with a law that would permit the indefinite detention of a non-citizen on domestic 
soil.  Thus, “once present in the country, aliens can claim due process protections.”168 
In further addressing this question, the court in Verdugo-Urquidez169 denied a motion to 
suppress evidence seized by agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency while searching the home 
 
165 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, Military Order of Nov. 
13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 222 § 1(f) (Nov. 16, 2001).  Further, Timothy Lynch, Power and Liberty in Wartime, 2004 
CATO SUP. CT. Rev. 23 (2004) has argued that: “President Bush shocked the American legal community by asserting 
what was essentially a ‘new day of executive detentions.’ But absent an invasion or rebellion on American soil, it is 
farfetched to suggest that any person in America can be imprisoned on the mere say-so of the president. However, it 
is not unreasonable or implausible to suggest that wartime circumstances can mean a change in the rules, methods, 
and procedures by which the government can deal with the problem of illegal aliens. American law generally denies 
the benefit of a transaction to one who procures the transaction with fraud. Thus, why should an individual who has 
entered the United States surreptitiously or through false pretenses benefit from that wrong by acquiring the full 
panoply of constitutional rights that are accorded to citizens and long-term permanent residents? Before a 
nonresident alien can acquire standing to assert constitutional protections against detention and imprisonment, the 
first order of business ought to be an examination of the prisoner's immigration status. ‘If that status was obtained by 
fraud, misrepresentation or other unlawful means, then it should be deemed void ab initio. Such an alien should be 
treated under the law as if he never was lawfully admitted to the United States-- because in a very real sense he was 
not.’” 
166 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
167 Shirin Sinnar, Patriotic or Unconstitutional: The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (2003). 
168 Id. 
169 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
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of a Mexican citizen without a warrant.170 While the Court held that 4th Amendment rights are 
not to be extended to non-citizens,171 Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, stated that the 
defendant should be entitled to Due Process Clause protection under the 5th Amendment when 
his case finally went to trial.172 
Specifically, the Court ruled that 4th Amendment protections did not extend to the home 
of a Mexican citizen in Mexico.173 The Court, however, made a point to distinguish its holding 
from one that would have occurred had the appeal been regarding the 5th Amendment.  In 
looking at the language of the 4th Amendment, the Court noted that the Amendment’s application 
was only to “the people.”174 The 5th and 6th Amendments, however, apply to “persons” or “the 
accused,” respectively.175 The Court although not explicitly extending 5th Amendment 
protections to non-citizens, used dicta to indicate that such a holding is not beyond the pale.   
 
While Cole convincingly argued that legal and illegal aliens should be entitled to the 
same rights and protections, it is important to note that his position is not uniformly accepted.  
Those with views in opposition to Cole’s argue that the extension of Constitutional protections to 
non-citizens is only permissible when such an individual has “some substantial connection to the 
United States.”176 The view believes that the law of the United States holds that only aliens 
within the U.S. territory are “persons” and that such status is wholly unavailable to any alien 
outside of the American border.177 
In examining the extension of 5th Amendment rights and protections to detainees in the 
interrogation setting, the applicable question here is whether this specific extension of rights to 
African-Americans in the Deep South is applicable to the hybrid paradigm detainees.  
Specifically, we must determine whether a detainee subjected to coercion is entitled to 5th 
170 Id. at 274-275. 
171 Id. at 265. 
172 Brenner A. Allen, A Cause of Action Against Private Contractors and the U.S. Government for Freedom of 
Speech Violations in Iraq, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L & COM. REG. 535 (2005). 
173 Verdugo-Urquidez at 271. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 265-66. 
176 See Parrish, supra note 38. 
177 Id. 
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Amendment privileges against self-incrimination.  In the wake of the Bram-Brown progeny 
holdings, which granted this right to African-Americans, I submit that extending the right to 
detainees is both constitutionally appropriate and necessary.  Though the detainees are not 
American citizens, their interrogation takes place in American custody on soil that is as 
American as possible without actually being within the American borders.178 Furthermore, the 
“ticking time bomb” justification is inapplicable here as, in the interrogation setting far from 
their base of operations, it is doubtful that the detainees presently represent a threat to those 
interrogating them.  
 
As the preceding discussion illuminates, consensus the extension of constitutional 
protections to non-citizens has not yet been reached.  However, as shown above, the Supreme 
Court is inclined to extend 5th Amendment safe-guards to all “persons” subject to control of the 
United States government.  Further, unlike immigrants, the detainees did not willingly come to 
be under U.S. control, but rather were brought under control by the U.S. authorities. 
 
Granted, it is arguable that by taking up arms against the U.S., the detainees were willful 
combatants placing themselves in this situation and therefore are not entitled to constitutional 
protections.  However, as the detainees are “innocent until proven guilty,” they are solely defined 
as suspects at the interrogation stage.  Suspects, regardless of what crime they may potentially be
found guilty of, are entitled to the 5th Amendment protections.  This principle holds true for 
African Americans in the Deep South, for all non-citizens living in the U.S., and for detainees 
held by the U.S. 
 
b) The 14th Amendment Right to Due Process 
In addition to extending 5th Amendment protections to African-Americans, the Bram-
Brown progeny stands for the proposition that the African Americans of the Deep South were to 
be extended the 14th Amendment guarantee of due process.179 As noted earlier, the discussion 
 
178 According to the administration which tried to claim that Guantanamo Bay was not actually American soil.  
179 Specifically, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  For discussion on the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights to 
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of extending constitutional protections to non-citizens has involved the 14th Amendment at 
almost every turn.180 Specifically, the drafters of the Constitution intended the 14th Amendment 
 
detainees, see Tamara Huckert, The Undetermined Fate of Guantanamo Bay Detainees’ Habeas Corpus Petitions, 9
GONZ. J. INT’L L. 236 (2005-2006); Michael I. Greenberger, Three Strikes and Your Outside the Constitution: Will 
the Guantanamo Bay Alien Detainees be Granted Fundamental Due Process?, 37 APR MD. B.J. 14 (2004); and 
Jeffery F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar Illegal 
Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 KY. L. J. 849 (2003).   
180 In Kwon v Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) and Jean v Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), the court noted that “as a 
general rule, aliens who are physically present in the United States are accorded the full panoply of traditional due 
process rights, while aliens merely seeking to enter the country do not enjoy such protection and find much less 
process due an adjudication of their right to admission.” 
In Medina v O’Neill, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988) and Lynch v Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir 1987), the court 
held that even though inadmissible aliens may not challenge admission decisions, and the like, “they are entitled 
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the 
hands of state or federal officials.” 
In Johnson v Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court, in discussing the constitutional rights of aliens, has 
stated in domestic matters that "”m]ere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct.”  
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the petitioners in Eisentrager had no standing to file a claim for habeas relief 
in a United States court. 
In In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005), the Court upheld a decision which was 
based on an interpretation that Eisentrager barred claims of any alien seeking to enforce the United States 
Constitution in a habeas proceeding unless the alien is in custody in sovereign United States territory. Recognizing 
that Guantanamo Bay is not part of the sovereign territory of the United States, the District Court dismissed the 
cases for lack of “jurisdiction to consider the constitutional claims that are presented to the Court for resolution.”  
After issuing a show cause order as to why an additional pending habeas case filed by a Guantanamo detainee 
should not be dismissed in light of the decision in Rasul, the District Court also dismissed that case, and all three 
cases were appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
In Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision, 
which had upheld the District Court, and held that the District Court did have jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ 
habeas claims. The majority noted several facts that distinguished the Guantanamo detainees from the petitioners in 
Eisentrager more than fifty years earlier:  “[The Guantanamo petitioners] are not nationals of countries at war with 
the United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; 
they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for 
more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction and control.”  Emphasizing that “[b]y the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States 
exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,” and highlighting that the 
government conceded at oral argument that “the habeas statute would create federal-court jurisdiction over the 
claims of an American citizen held at the base,” the Court concluded, “Aliens held at the base, no less than 
American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority under [the habeas statute].”  
The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that the allegations contained in the petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus “unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States’” as 
required by the habeas statute, and concluded by instructing that “whether and what further proceedings may 
become necessary after respondents make their response to the merits of petitioners’ claims are matters that we need 
not address now. What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the 
legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of 
wrongdoing. Answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand for the District Court to consider in the first instance the merits of petitioners’ claims.”  Rasul at 68-73. 
The court in Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) held that the President constitutionally detained the 
petitioner, a United States citizen, as an enemy combatant pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him by the United 
States Constitution, the court noting that one who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, 
regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as such. This annotation 
Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot? 
40
to apply to non-citizens as opposed to the unclear history of the 5th Amendment.  The 
Congressional debates surrounding the adoption of the 14th Amendment show that the drafters 
had a close familiarity with the provisions of the Articles of Confederation, a document that 
noted a strict line of demarcation between “citizens” and “persons.”  The framers of the 14th 
Amendment did not use the term “citizens,” but rather made frequent reference to “persons,” 
which can be interpreted to include non-citizens.181 This is highly relevant to the focus of this 
article in analyzing whether the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding due process, as discussed 
earlier, may be applied to the category of persons to be protected by the hybrid paradigm: 
detainees. 
 
c) Constitutional Rights and Due Process Applied To the Hybrid Paradigm 
In discussing how to apply the 5th and 14th Amendments to the hybrid paradigm, case law 
illuminates an analysis of both the “totality of the circumstances” test and the “voluntariness” 
tests.182 The “totality of the circumstances” approach is a test where the Court examines all of 
the factors surrounding a confession to independently determine its validity.  The “voluntariness 
test,” then, specifically focuses on whether the defendant independently chose to confess.   
 
The “voluntariness test,” which is the most applicable test specifically targeting 
confessions, finds its roots in English common law and early American jurisprudence.183 In 
evolving from earlier tests, the American courts began to recognize two constitutional bases for 
the requirement that a confession be voluntary: the 5th Amendment right against self-
 
collects and discusses the cases that have considered the executive branch's designation of a person as an unlawful 
or enemy combatant.” 
See also, Cole and Dempsey, supra note 139. 
181 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1638 (1862). 
182 See Magid, supra at note 114. 
183 See King v Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (1783) (stating that the English courts excluded confessions obtained 
by threats and promises) and King v Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783) (“A free and voluntary confession is 
deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt…but a confession 
forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape…that no 
credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.”). 
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incrimination and the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause.184 The operative question in any 
application of the “voluntariness test” is how deferential185 of a “voluntariness test” ought to be 
used for detainees interrogated in the context of “armed conflict short of war.”186 
As an example: should interrogators be allowed to apply physical force to get the 
detainee to talk? Does the Constitution and case law enable interrogators to threaten the detainee 
in the name of national security so that all sense of balance between the rights of the state and the 
equally legitimate rights of the individual will be skewed?187 Is cumulative mistreatment to be 
applied until the detainee “breaks down” and “spills the beans”—regardless of the truth of the 
information? 
 
Under an analysis of history, it is evident that common law had no constraints on 
permissible methods used to gain a confession.  However, the United States courts grew 
concerned about the reliability of these confessions when physical abuse was involved.  Thus, as 
shown in the facts of Brown, the Court found that facts surrounding the interrogation had led to a 
false confession because, despite the growing concerns over such practices, law enforcement 
continued to employ the “third degree.”188 
In discussing the dilemma faced by applying 5th and 14th Amendment tests, Laura Magid 
pointed to the use of the “totality of the circumstances” test when she noted that: 
The totality of the circumstances test required courts to consider: the 
conduct and actions of the officers; the physical surroundings of the 
interrogation; and the characteristics and status of the defendant, 
 
184 See Bram, stating that the test is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment…commanding that no 
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and Brown, reversing a conviction 
under the Due Process Clause because it was based on coerced confession. 
185 Deferential as understood to provide the interrogators great latitude in their efforts to seek a confession from 
the suspect and consequently understood to be a minimizing of his 5th amendment right not to self-incriminate.  For 
instance, see Justice O’Connor’s words in Hamdi: “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption 
in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair 
opportunity for rebuttal were provided.” 
186 See infra at note 3. 
187 See Guiora, supra note 8, for a discussion regarding balancing in counter-terrorism. 
188 See Magid, supra note 114.  “Due process required interrogation procedures that would yield voluntary, and 
therefore reliable, statements. Courts used a ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis to determine whether ‘the 
interrogation was . . . unreasonable or shocking, or if the accused clearly did not have an opportunity to make a 
rational or intelligent choice.’” 
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including both physical and mental condition. Some types of police 
conduct were deemed so coercive that no examination of the particular 
susceptibilities of the suspect was even necessary. Most notably, physical 
violence and threats, whether implicit or explicit, could not be directed 
against any suspect. Physical mistreatment, such as extended periods of 
interrogation without intervals for sleep, also provided grounds for 
finding involuntariness.189 
In the alternative, then, Magid proposes the use of a third test, the “shocks the 
conscience” test: 
 
The Court has suggested that a ‘shock the conscience’ standard may be 
useful for determining when police deception during interrogation goes 
too far. The Court applied the shock the conscience standard when it 
considered police deception not towards a suspect, but towards the 
attorney for the suspect who was interrogated. In 1986, in Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the Court heard a claim that the police 
violated due process: 1) by failing to inform the defendant that an 
attorney, retained by his sister, was trying to contact him; and, 2) by 
falsely telling the attorney that the suspect would not be questioned that 
day. The Court rejected the claim, finding that ‘egregious . . . police 
deception might rise to a level of a due process violation,” but that the 
conduct in Moran ‘falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks 
sensibilities of civilized society as to’ violate due process. 
 
Under a shock the conscience standard, techniques cannot be considered 
shocking simply because they are successful in convincing suspects to 
give truthful confessions. The shock the conscience standard bars only 
those few techniques that, even though they do not involve physical 
coercion clearly forbidden under the voluntariness test, and even though 
they do not implicate the concerns of the reliability rationale, nevertheless 
violate canons fundamental to the traditions and conscience of our people.  
Although the hypothetical involving the imposter chaplain is not the only 
technique that shocks the conscience by violating a fundamental value, it 
is one of only a small group.”190 
For this discussion, I propose that applying both the “voluntariness test” and the “shocks 
the conscience” test from the criminal law paradigm are the most appropriate tests to be 
superimposed onto the hybrid paradigm.  These tests are the most appropriate because, in 
 
189 Id. at 1173. 
190 Id. at 1209. 
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comparing them to other alternatives, they are the most articulate tests focused specifically on 
the tactics used in gaining information and whether those tactics broke the detainees’ will.  
Further, the “shocks the conscience” test, in particular, is useful as it is not concerned with the 
eventual use of the information received; rather, it focuses solely on the acceptability of 
techniques used.  This test is useful here because detainee interrogations often take divergent 
forms, where interrogations seek either intelligence information or information for an upcoming 
trial.  The use of the “shocks the conscience” test permits the development of standards 
specifically addressing the conduct, with no concern for how the received information will be 
used.  Thus, the use of this test eliminates the counter argument that detainee standards must be 
different than criminal law because the interrogations have different aims.  On the other hand, 
standards like the “exclusionary rule” from criminal procedure would prove ineffective as it only 
applies to the use of information, thus causing it to fail in the detainee interrogations aimed 
solely at intelligence gathering. 
 
However, in order to understand how this superimposition can occur, it is critical to step 
back into American history.  Again, the proper frame of reference is not the twenty-first 
century,191 but rather the treatment of African-Americans in the 1930’s and 1940’s, as described 
infra at Section III.  Choosing the Deep South as the frame of reference, rather than staying with 
modern day examples from the “war on terrorism” is beneficial because one learns better from 
applying history to today’s world rather than applying circumstances from today’s world to 
today’s world. 
 
In light of southern sheriffs and deputies interrogating African Americans while exposing 
them to the brutality of mob rule, the Bram-Brown progeny held that such actions were violative 
of both the 5th and 14th Amendments.  A particularly important aspect of the Bram-Brown 
progeny is the fact that the Courts did not articulate or create a new set of rules, but rather dealt 
with the issues through a progressive and active implementation of the 5th and 14th 
191 Despite the modern day abuses like the Abner Louima case where New York City officers shoved a broom 
handle into a Haitian immigrant’s rectum.  See 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/02/28/police.torture.overturn/index.html (last accessed February 5, 2007). 
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Amendments.192 This transformative moment in American constitutional law, initiated by the 
Supreme Court, led to a fundamental restructuring of the basic rights of African Americans.  
This is evidenced by the fact that, rather than allow officials to continue the mistreatment, the 
beatings, whippings, degradations and humiliations, the Supreme Court mandated the extension 
of the 5th and 14th Amendments.193 Ultimately, the criminal law paradigm was held to be 
applicable not only to whites, but also to the “not-fully-citizen” blacks. 
 
Today, the U.S. is at yet another transformative moment in American society which must 
lead to a restructuring of basic constitutional guarantees similar to the holdings of the Bram-
Brown progeny.  Again recognizing that the detainees are not American citizens, they still must 
be granted certain protections.194 When the Court indicated that the continued abuse of African 
Americans was impermissible, the remedy was the extension of the 5th and 14th Amendments.  
Thus, if the 5th and 14th Amendments were deemed to be tools to protect a discriminated and 
oppressed group from coercive interrogations, then the same jurisprudential standard should be 
extrapolated for detainees.   
 
VI: Defining Coercive Interrogation, Torture, and Analyzing Relevant Cases    
 The entirety of the discussion thus far has revolved around the coercive interrogation of 
detainees through the use of threats and cumulative mistreatment.  Before going any further, it is 
important to determine what coercive interrogation is and the reality of its modern day use. 
 
a) Defining Coercive Interrogation 
192 See Magid, supra note 114; David E. Berstein, Fifty Years After Bolling v Sharpe: Bolling, Equal Protection, 
Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER THE LAW (1965); 
Akil Reed Amar, Forward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); Richard A. Primus, The 
Riddle of Hiram Revel’s, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (2006); Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us About Its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289 (2006); and Jack M. 
Balkin, Wrong the Day It Was Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677 (2005). 
193 Id.
194 I have discussed the limits of those constitutional rights in Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for 
the Detention of Terrorists, See Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 7. The discussion of the limits of those rights 
has been made inevitable by the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan; rather than the Bush Administration's initial 
theory of granting minimal rights to the detainees, the Court has forced the White House and Congress alike to 
engage in active debate regarding what rights must be granted the detainees. While this article does not address the 
limits of all rights to be granted, it does seek to delineate detainee rights in the interrogation setting. 
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One proposed definition of “coercive interrogation” was put forth by Professors Posner 
and Vermeule: 
(1) the application of force, physical or mental (2) in order to extract 
information (3) necessary to save others. Coercive interrogation can range 
from the mild to the severe. At some point of severity, coercive 
interrogation becomes a species of ‘torture,’ which is flatly prohibited by 
domestic and international law. Coercive interrogation and torture are 
thus partially overlapping concepts; neither is a proper subset of the other. 
Mild coercive interrogation does not amount to legal ‘torture,’ which 
requires that a threshold of severity be met. And there are forms of torture 
that are not coercive interrogation--for example, when torture is used as a 
means of political intimidation or oppression, indeed for any purpose 
other than extracting information necessary to save third-party lives.195 
Given the documented instances in which those “in the field” have applied a “liberal 
application test” to regulations, rules, and guidelines, proposed definitions and standards must be 
neither circular nor over-burdened with legalese and technicalities.  Continuing to promulgate 
memos with vague standards serves only to create an environment whereby detainees could be 
subjected to treatment similar to that forever seared in the collective conscience of millions of 
Arabs.  It is likely that Lyndi England, the Abu Ghraib guard photographed abusing detainees, 
did not read either Jay Bybee’s or John Yoo’s memos196 elusively discussing permissible 
interrogation standards, and, in all probability, her immediate commanders also did not receive 
copies.  Although Lyndi England did not specifically read the memos and then make a decision 
based on the arguments contained therein, these memos tainted the mood and atmosphere 
throughout the military whereby such abuses were able to fester. 
Although responsibility, discretion, and judgment are the essence of command, the fine-
lined approach proposed above by Posner and Vermeule is problematic from the perspective of 
interrogation room realities.  It may be satisfactory to create vague and evasive standards when 
writing from the protected vantage point of American academia, but the practical reality is the 
impact such proposals will have when put into action on the ground.  The political fall-out that 
resulted from the soldiers’ misinterpretation and abuse of vague standards, is far too damaging 
 
195 See Posner and Vermeule, supra note 2. 
196 See Joseph Margulies, The Right to a Fair Trial in the War on Terror, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 57, 61 (2006) for a 
discussion of both memos. 
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and dangerous to continue to leave the interpretation of these loosely defined principles to those 
on the front lines. 
 
The potential for improper application of guidelines is particularly poignant when one 
considers the fact that the aforementioned abuses were able to take place under the following two 
standards articulated by the U.S. Army: 
 
Army Regulation 190-8, paragraph 2-1(d), contains a reference to allowable procedures: 
Prisoners may be interrogated in the combat zone. The use of physical or 
mental torture or any coercion to compel prisoners to provide information 
is prohibited.... Prisoners may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to 
unpleasant or disparate treatment of any kind because of their refusal to 
answer questions. 
 
Finally, and most definitively, Army Field Manual 34-52, the controlling doctrine on this 
subject, states: 
U.S. policy expressly prohibit[s] acts of violence or intimidation, 
including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to 
inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogations. Such illegal 
acts are not authorized and will not be condoned by the US Army. Acts in 
violation of these prohibitions are criminal acts punishable under the 
[Uniform Code of Military Justice].197 
As these above cited standards appear clear and concise, they suffered from “slippery 
slope” interpretation showing that even these were not clear enough.  In short, when drafting 
rules and procedures, not only should they be clear, they must be clear.  If the standards adopted 
are not clear and precise, they are destined for abuse and “adaptive” interpretation.  Similar to the 
“void for vagueness” doctrine,198 a set of standards and procedures which are overly vague must 
be held void for their lack of specificity.  Vague rules only serve to allow for a slippery slope. 
 
As discussed earlier, the United States government has taken steps towards addressing 
the questions of coercive interrogation by the recent adoption of the Military Commissions Act 
 
197 Army Field Manual 34-52, (2006). 
198 See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 279 (2003). 
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of 2006.199 However, despite this step in the direction of addressing the Court’s concerns in 
Hamdan, it is wholly insufficient in remedying the lack of interrogation standards.200 Again, the 
establishment of interrogation standards must be done in a clear and specific way so that the 
interrogators themselves know exactly what is permissible and what is off limits.  Thus, the 
evasiveness of the Military Commissions Act leaves itself open to far too many “on the 
battlefield” abuses. 
 
In creating these standards, there is a delicate balance between the government’s national 
security interests and the equally valid interests of the individual in his personal autonomy.  I 
propose that these two interests are effectively balanced through the clear articulation of 
permissible interrogation standards that permit the following five interrogation methods: a) the 
use of uncomfortable chairs, b) room temperature modification, c) sleep deprivation, d) loud 
music, and e) the use of hoods. 
 
Further, in applying these acceptable interrogation methods, there is also a need for an 
active judiciary.201 Specifically, an active judiciary is necessary to challenge an unfettered 
executive to guarantee that the competing interests of national security and of the individual 
detainee are being considered and balanced against each other.   
b) Reality of Modern Day Coercive Interrogation 
Much like the members of the Wickersham Commission were shocked to discover the 
realities of the “third degree,”202 American policymakers were equally shocked by the reality of 
Abu Ghraib.203 Thus, the fine-lined argument developed by Posner and Vermeule does not 
match the real-life happenings in detainee interrogations.  The practical reality is that in any 
 
199 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006). 
200 The Military Commission Act allows for executive interpretation of coercive interrogation standards, rather 
than a clearly articulation of the standards up front in the legislation. 
201 Independent judicial review guarantees both procedural and substantive oversight.  Specifically, Israel has the 
most fully developed two track judicial approach to terrorism in that defendants may be brought either to court for a 
full criminal trial or detained administratively subject to independent judicial review.  See Guiora, Where are 
Terrorists to be Tried, supra note 7. 
202 See infra at note 60. 
203 Frank Rich, Saving Private England, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004.  
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setting, interrogation clearly puts the power of the State against the power of the individual.  
Both the Supreme Court and scholars alike have commented that the setting is a fundamental 
“mismatch.”204 This “mismatch” was particularly acute in the context of the fundamental 
violations of constitutional rights in the Deep South.  The fundamental inequality present in 
interrogations is also clearly present in Guantanamo today as the typical detainee is powerless, 
thousands of miles from his home, unclear of his whereabouts, and, most likely, not an English-
language speaker. 
 
It is for that reason that Professors Posner and Vermeule’s attempt to find a “middle 
ground” must be rejected. The quote below, reflective of their jurisprudential approach, is 
problematic in the real world of both Montgomery, Alabama and Guantanamo: 
 
All we suggest is that law should treat coercive interrogation the way it 
treats other grave evils. Law has a typical or baseline regulatory strategy 
for coping with grave evils that sometimes produce greater goods. That 
strategy involves a complex regulatory regime of rules-with-exceptions, 
involving a prohibition on official infliction of serious harms, permission 
to inflict such harms in tightly cabined circumstances, an immunity 
regime that requires officials to follow the rules in good faith but protects 
them if they do so, and review procedures to reduce error and enhance 
transparency. In this baseline regime, the circumstances in which serious 
harms may be inflicted are specified ex ante, rather than being remitted 
solely to the discretionary mercy of juries, judges, and the executive after 
the fact. Contrary to the academic consensus, we see no plausible reason 
for treating coercive interrogation differently.205 
Such a “middle ground” approach cannot persist as coercive interrogation must be treated 
differently, rather than in the same way as “other grave evils,” as Posner and Vermeule prefer.  
In an environment of such inherent unfairness, this argument of “fine-lining” is inappropriate in 
and of itself because of the numerous abuses shown so far in the “war on terrorism.” 
 
c) Torture 
 
204 See Laura Hoffman Roppe, True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to 
Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 758 (1994) and William T. Pizzi and Morris B. Hoffman, Taking 
Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 819 (2005). 
205 See Posner and Vermeule, supra note 2. 
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The topic of torture has been critiqued, discussed, and analyzed.206 As noted earlier, this 
article is not intended to add to the torture, or “ticking time bomb,” debate.  Nevertheless, any 
discussion of developing interrogation standards for detainees must consider torture.  At the 
outset, torture is unequivocally illegal, immoral, and does not lead to actionable intelligence.207 
Nevertheless, others have taken the opposite position, and, in an effort to establish the 
parameters of detainee interrogation, it is important to discuss such views.  
 
To begin, torture is defined by the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as: 
 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.208 
The European Commission of Human Rights has stated that: 
(t)he notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as 
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical. Further, 
treatment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly 
 
206 See generally Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, 
Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255 (2006); Joshua A. Decker, Is the United States Bound by the Customary 
International Law of Torture? A Proposal for ATS Litigation in the War on Terror, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 803 (2006); 
Jeffery C. Goldman, Treaties and Torture: How the Supreme Court Can Restrain the Executive, 55 DUKE L.J. 609 
(2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 
(2005); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2005); Next CIA Chief 
Must Forswear Torture Tactics, BALTIMORE SUN, May 15, 2006; Steve Chapman, Unconscionable Torture Tactics: 
Will the Next CIA Director Have the Courage to Swear Off Waterboarding? CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 11, 2006; 
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Gross, Art Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481 
(2004), Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of 
September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013 (2003); and Carol Rosenberg, U.S.: Block Any Evidence Obtained Via Torture,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, March 24, 2006. 
207 See Guiora and Page, supra note 5. 
208 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 
39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
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humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his own will or 
conscience.209 
Further, in the widely quoted and cited Cleveland Principles, torture was succinctly 
defined as “any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.” 210 
In defense of torture, consider the arguments of Bagaric and Clarke211 who speculate that 
torture may be acceptable in certain conditions: 
The only situation where torture is justifiable is where it is used as an 
information gathering technique to avert a grave risk. In such 
circumstances, there are five variables relevant in determining whether 
torture is permissible and the degree of torture that is appropriate. The 
variables are (1) the number of lives at risk; (2) the immediacy of the 
harm; (3) the availability of other means to acquire the information; (4) 
the level of wrongdoing of the agent; and (5) the likelihood that the agent 
actually does possess the relevant information. Where (1), (2), (4) and (5) 
rate highly and (3) is low, all forms of harm may be inflicted on the 
agent--even if this results in death.212 
Writing in response to Bagaric and Clarke, Rumney asserts that the fundamental problem 
is the “end product.” 213 Whether it is termed “actionable intelligence,”214 or “bad information 
and false confessions,”215 the bottom line is the same: experience has shown that information 
received from a tortured detainee is overwhelmingly inaccurate, unreliable and of minimal value 
in preventing acts of terrorism.216 
Further, torture ought to be pragmatically avoided as intelligence gained through torture 
may damage the investigatory process itself.  In hearings concerning the confirmation of Alberto 
Gonzales as United States Attorney General, Douglas A. Johnson, executive director of The 
 
209 See Nan Miller, International Protections of the Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary Confinement in the U.S. a 
Violation of International Standards, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 139 (1995). 
210 The “Cleveland Principles” emanated from the “Torture and the War on Terror” conference held at Case 
Western School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio on October 7, 2005.  The text of the resolution may be found at: 
http://www.law.case.edu/centers/cox/content.asp?content_id=85 (last accessed July 26, 2006). 
211 See Bagaric and Clarke, supra note 5. 
212 Id.
213 See Rumney, supra note 5. 
214 See Guiora and Page, supra note 5. 
215 See Rumney, supra note 5, at 493. 
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Center for Victims of Torture, claimed that arguing for the necessity of torture rests on 
“unproven assumptions based on anecdotes from agencies with little transparency.”217 
According to Johnson:  
 
Well trained interrogators, within the military, the FBI, and the police 
have testified that torture does not work, is unreliable and distracting from 
the hard work of interrogation. Nearly every client at the Center for 
Victims of Torture, when subjected to torture, confessed to a crime they 
did not commit, gave up extraneous information, or supplied names of 
innocent friends or colleagues to their torturers. It is a great source of 
shame for our clients, who tell us they would have said anything their 
tormentors wanted them to say in order to get the pain to stop. Such 
extraneous information distracts, rather than supports, valid 
investigations.218 
Further, commenting on the coercive interrogation techniques authorized by the Bush 
Administration and scandals such as Abu Ghraib, David Gottlieb219 states that: “[o]nce these 
powers were placed in the hands of poorly-trained reservists, they morphed into something more 
sinister.”220 
Lending credence to the words of both Johnson and Gottlieb, the current allegations of 
improper treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan strongly suggests 
that allowing coercive techniques221 has led to even more serious abuses.222 This is evidenced by 
the testimony of a former military interrogator in Afghanistan, Chris Mackey.  Mackey recounts 
how the mental pressures can further contribute to a slippery slope: 
When we arrived in Afghanistan, I had an unshakable conviction that we 
should follow the rules to the letter: no physical touching, no stress 
positions, no ‘dagger on the table’ threats, and no deprivation of sleep . . . 
but I knew that it was possible to make bad decisions in the heat of the 
moment, that it was easy for emotions to overwhelm good judgment. 
 
217 Nomination of the Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to President George W. Bush, to be the Attorney 
General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9-10 (2005) (testimony of 
Douglas A. Johnson). 
218 Id. 
219 Professor at Kansas School of Law 
220 David J. Gottlieb, How We Came to Torture, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 455 (2005). 
221 See infra at note 71 for the types of coercive techniques permitted by the Bush Administration. 
222 This inference can easily be made given the abuses at Abu Ghraib. 
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Following the rules to the letter was the safe route. Even entertaining the 
idea of doing otherwise was inviting ‘slippage.’223 
Mackey’s words speak loudly of the inherent and implicit danger of the inevitable 
“slippery slope.”  Even if moderate safeguards are instituted, as recommended by Prof. 
Dershowitz,224 it is all but inevitable that an interrogator somewhere, sometime, will 
“misunderstand,” “misinterpret,” or, even worse, be classified by an American President as a 
“bad apple who does not represent the American military.”225 In short, unclear or evasive 
guidelines lend themselves too easily to misinterpretation “in the field.”  This becomes 
particularly important when noting that the most recent legislative response to this question, the 
Military Commissions Act of 2001,226 stops short of clearly and specifically delineating 
permissible and impermissible actions.  Thus, the United States is still in great need of clear and 
concise standards espoused by political leaders. 
 
While many, such as Posner and Vermeule,227 argue persuasively that an explicit ban on 
torture should not be extended to include coercive interrogation, the relevant question is whether 
their definition of “coercive interrogation” is tantamount to the above referenced definitions of 
“torture.”  In this respect, the definitions ultimately used in the new standards cannot be a matter 
of mere semantics as they forecast the application of both law and policy.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, the distinction between harsh, yet permissible, methods of interrogation and torture is 
far too tenuous and would require extensive training and outstanding command and control 
mechanisms.228 Thus, it is simply implausible to adhere to the amorphous views of those 
desiring to permit some forms of coercive interrogations, but not others.  Such a holding is 
simply impractical. 
 
It is important to briefly note the existence of a difference between the concepts of torture 
and coercive interrogation.  In making this distinction, “the most important inquiry for 
 
223 See Rumney, supra note 5, at 504-505. 
224 See Dershowitz, supra note 5. 
225 See Mr. Rumsfeld’s Defense, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004. 
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interrogations is the applicable definition of coercion. Webster's Dictionary defines coercion as 
‘the threat of force used to enforce an act a person would not wish to carry out voluntarily or by 
persuasion. Often, it involves the use of actual force in order to make the threat credible, but it is 
the threat of (further) force which brings about the cooperation of the person being coerced.’”229 
This differs from torture as torture remains the actual use of force or abuse.  
 
Thus far, the discussion has suggested that the hybrid paradigm provides a satisfactory 
answer, in the spirit of Hamdan, to establishing an appropriate rule of law for detainees.  Further, 
it has been argued that the 5th and 14th Amendments are applicable to the interrogation setting, 
though not to initial detention in the “zone of combat” or fully to the trial phase of the “armed 
conflict short of war.”  Moreover, as I have argued repeatedly, torture, however it is phrased, 
spun or articulated, is illegal and its advocates are pushing interrogators down a very dangerous 
slippery slope.  In the next section, we shall define and address “threats” as applied to the hybrid 
paradigm. 
 
VII. Defining Threats 
In order to further the determination of appropriate standards from the criminal law 
paradigm for the hybrid paradigm interrogations, using the Deep South experiences as a guide, 
threats and cumulative mistreatment now serve as the “analytical road map.”  While other 
aspects of traditional interrogation are equally applicable, threats and cumulative mistreatment 
enable an analysis of the proposed hybrid model, as both have long been a mainstay of criminal 
law interrogations and have been subject to critique and analysis for many years.230 
In determining permissible or impermissible threats in interrogation, the Rehnquist Court 
provided some guidance.  As Welsh White notes: 
 
Indeed, the limitations of the pre- Miranda voluntariness test prompted 
the Court to seek ‘some automatic device by which the potential evils of 
incommunicado interrogation [could] be controlled.’ Simultaneously, 
 
229 Amos N. Guiora, We’re at War: We Need Information, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, September 28, 2006. 
230 See infra at Sect. III. 
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those concerned with restraining pernicious interrogation practices sought 
a constitutional rule that would impose effective, general restraints on the 
police. Miranda represented the solution to these problems. To the extent 
that the Court intended Miranda to replace the due process voluntariness 
test, however, the Miranda Court did not contemplate the important role 
that the due process voluntariness test would continue to play in 
regulating post-waiver interrogation practices.231 
The primary danger in permitting interrogators to threaten a detainee is the risk of 
eliciting an involuntary and false confession from a detainee who desires the cessation of such 
threats, leading him to espouse any information believed to meet the interrogator’s wishes. 
 
a) What is a Threat? 
Threats can take many forms: threatening a suspect to cause harm to his relatives 
(particularly females); threatening to move him from jurisdiction to jurisdiction;232 turning the 
suspect over to an angry mob (particularly when the African American suspect is accused of 
having killed or desired to kill a white person);233 or threatening or intimating to the suspect that 
he will be physically harmed unless he confesses.234 
The determination of whether specific language amounts to a threat will depend on the 
circumstances of its use.  In making this determination, a court would, as discussed earlier, 
employ a “totality of circumstances” test. The determination of whether certain conduct 
constitutes a threat looks at whether, in light of the circumstances, the accused’s will was 
overborne at the time he confessed. 235 If it is determined that an interrogator did in fact threaten 
the subject individual, it is of no consequence whether that threat specifically produced fear in 
the interrogated individual as any threat that yields apprehension of harm will suffice for the 
invalidation of the confession.  More specifically, if the threat is of a violent nature, there is no 
 
231 Welsh S. White, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Concession of Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001). 
232 See infra at Sect. III(c). for a discussion of Brown.
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need to even measure the specific impact on the will of the victim, as a violent threat is per se 
invalid.236 
An examination of relevant threat jurisprudence237 leads to the conclusion that “threats” 
are neither definitively nor consistently defined. Whether the test is akin to Justice Stewart's 
definition regarding pornography238 is perhaps an open question, but, for the purposes of this 
article, “threat,” in the context of the hybrid paradigm, will be defined as interrogation methods 
inducing a suspect to provide his interrogator(s) with information when under the impression 
that to do otherwise will result in penalty either to himself or to others. 239 
Ronald Allen,240 writing in support of Prof. Kamisar, offers a slightly more “middle 
ground” approach when he suggests that interrogation and threats be analyzed as follows: “an 
interrogation was proper that was not obtained through physical violence or its threat, and did not 
overbear the will of the suspect; ‘overbearing the will’ in turn was best defined by tactics that 
might lead an innocent person to confess.”241 In attempting his own definition, Allen emphasizes 
the “will” of the suspect and whether threats used in the interrogation setting overcame that 
“will.” 
 
b) Testing the Impact of a Threat on a Confession – the “Voluntariness Test” 
As noted earlier, the interrogation room represents a complete inequality where the state 
posses both the resources and the inherently threatening position, and, as such, the “battle” 
 
236 Id.
237 See Frazier v State, 107 So.2d 16 (1958); State v Bernard, 106 So. 656 (1925); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 93 
S. Ct. 2041 (1973); U.S. v Robinson, 698 F.2d 448 (1983); Stephen v State, 11 Ga. 225 (1852); and Stein v People 
of State of New York, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953). 
238 Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), in which the majority commented 
regarding pornography that “I know it when I see it.” 
239 In proposing this definition, I seek to balance between legitimate and lawful interrogation methods and 
unlawful measures which violate the detainee's constitutional rights.  Furthermore, the definition intends to articulate 
clear criteria and parameters of the “limits of the permissible.”  The definition both draws on the enormous 
contributions of others and on my own professional interrogation experiences. 
240 Ronald Allen, In Praise of Yale Kasmir, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9 (Fall, 2004).  
241 Id. at 17. 
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cannot be a fair fight.  The question, though, is whether an interrogator’s actions increased this 
inherently threatening situation to impose undue force on the individual to confess.  
 
As Fred Inbau and John Reid make clear, the distinctions between permissible and 
impermissible interrogation methods are a matter of degree.  “Under any test of confession 
admissibility….a confession was legally invalid if it had been obtained after a suspect had been 
led to believe that unless he confessed he was in danger of loss of life or bodily harm.”242 A
particularly manipulative example of a threat that would nullify a confession is telling a suspect 
that unless he confesses the police will apprehend and accuse his wife, his mother, or some other 
person close to him.243 
c) Application Regarding Threats 
In applying criminal law principles to the hybrid paradigm, the focus returns to the 
“voluntariness” test, which, in the absence of the clear use of force or threats of force, applies to 
determine whether the confession was voluntary.  In making this determination, the court must 
assess both the interrogators’ practices and the suspect’s individual characteristics for the 
purpose of determining whether the suspect’s will was overcome.244 
If the confession is determined to be involuntary, then the court must rule the statement 
inadmissible.  Thus, the proper remedy would be similar to, if not analogous to, the exclusionary 
rule.  Conversely, if legitimate threats led to the confession, then the statement may be useable.  
According to the criminal law paradigm jurisprudence, voluntariness is the critical variable in 
determining admissibility.  Again, I propose that the adoption of the hybrid paradigm would 
obviate much of this confusion.245 Adopting the hybrid paradigm would create a clear system, 
whereby there is less need for discretional analysis in determining voluntariness. 
 
242 FRED E. INBAU AND JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 187 (1967) (emphasis 
added). 
243 Id. at 188. 
244 Welsh S. White, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Concession of Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001). 
245 See Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 7. 
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In determining whether, after a threat has been made, the confession was voluntary, I 
suggest the following spectrum: at one extreme is the implied or direct threat to a family 
member;246 immediately adjacent are threats discussed by the Supreme Court as reviewed in 
section II,247 and at the other extreme are legitimate threats such as the mention of possible 
prison sentence for obstructing justice. 
 
Inbau and Reid offer insight on delineating lawful threats: 
 
Advising or imploring a subject to tell the truth is never considered 
objectionable.  Some difficulty arises when the interrogator uses such 
language as ‘It would be better for you to confess’; ‘You had better 
confess’; ‘It would be better for you to tell the truth’; or ‘You had better 
tell the truth’. A number of courts have held that such statements as ‘You 
had better confess’ or ‘It would be better for you to confess,’ constitute 
threats or promises which will nullify a confession. Some courts have 
gone so far as to hold that the same rejection rule applies even when the 
suspect is merely told ‘it would be better to tell the truth.248 
One might interject a concern that this application of these restrictive criminal law 
principles to detainee interrogations will “handicap” the interrogator in his protection of national 
security.  However, this would be no truer than for the police detective.  If society has 
determined that police can effectively investigate murders and rapes under a set of standards that 
do not allow for harsh interrogation methods, then interrogators of detainees should be able to 
conduct their interrogations in a similar fashion.   
 
As Kreimer recently argued: 
In reconciling order and liberty, American traditions have denounced the 
use of torture and its cognates not because such measures are irrational, 
 
246 In 1988, when serving as a Prosecutor in the West Bank Military Court, I received the following phone call on 
a Friday night from an attorney representing a Palestinian suspected of having committing an act of terrorism: “Have 
you guys (the reference was to the IDF/General Security Services) gone crazy…my client tells me you threatened to 
arrest his sister and mother with the implied threat that their modesty will be violated.” I promised to intervene in the 
matter, spoke with relevant security officials, was assured no such threat had been made and accordingly updated the 
attorney who seemed reassured by my response. As I heard nor received any additional complaint regarding the 
matter, I viewed the matter as closed. I bring this to the reader’s attention in order to highlight the extraordinary 
sensitivity in Islam to such threats, the requirement to assure that interrogators do not “cross the line” and the need 
to establish clear guidelines.  
247 See infra at Sect. III for discussions of the threats made against African-Americans in the Deep South. 
248 See Inbau and Reid, supra note 242 at 190. 
Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot? 
58
but because they corrode the core of our liberty and of our national 
identity. Even the Bush administration is unwilling to claim publicly that 
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ is consistent with American 
values. It maintains that its policy is to treat prisoners ‘humanely,’ while, 
with the fine hypocrisy that marks the homage of vice to virtue, it defines 
‘torture lite’ as humane.249 
While Kreimer’s comments are addressing torture, the comments are applicable to the 
proposals of this article.  In short, no theories which allow for “wiggle room” should be 
accepted.  The acceptance of such a standard, like Kreimer’s “torture lite,”250 creates a system 
which permits the government to abuse a detainee. 
 
The limits of interrogation, however defined and in whatever paradigm, are the core issue 
in seeking information. The Supreme Court’s articulation of the limits of interrogation was valid 
in the context of the abuses suffered by African Americans in harsh, cruel and violent settings. 
Those same principles are also relevant to the interrogation setting of this current armed conflict, 
as the threats that interrogators have made to detainees since 9/11 are disturbingly similar in 
nature to those made 70 years ago in a different context.251 The fear, disconnect, and 
vulnerability felt by suspects in the Deep South is existentially and psychologically similar to 
that felt by the detainees.252 
249 See Kreimer, supra note 75.  
250 Id.
251 See Table of Interrogation Techniques Recommended/Approved by U.S. Officials, Human Rights Watch, for a 
discussion of specific threatening actions permitted in the interrogation of detainees, available at 
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/0819interrogation.htm (last accessed February 5, 2007). 
252 I have, over the course of my 19 year career, met with Palestinian detainees in various stages of the process: 
from those just arrested, to remand hearings that I conducted, to trials that I both appeared in as a prosecutor to those 
I conducted as a judge. In addition, I have met with detainees in the context of visits conducted by various human 
rights organizations to prisons. I feel qualified to state the following: the system which is ultimately comprised of 
individuals serving in  a wide range of security related positions attempts to balance the legitimate needs of the 
detainees with pressing, sometimes urgent matters of state security. Most of the detainees understand the “rules of 
the game” and are well aware of the process, particularly those who have been arrested, if not tried, in the past. 
Nevertheless, a certain percentage of the detainees are clearly under pressure and in “stress mode.”  When 
threatened, they are more susceptible to providing sometimes critically needed information to their interrogators. 
Are the interrogations conducted in such as a way as to accommodate the prisoner's “comfort zone?”  The answer is 
obviously no. That being said, I am of the belief that most of the individuals involved in the process understand what 
I refer to as “the limits of the interrogation” and are conscious of the illegality of unlawful threats. It should be 
added that in various capacities during my IDF service I was involved in the training of various units involved in the 
process. There was a clear understanding that “limits” had to be taught and re-taught. Nevertheless, there is no doubt 
that excess occurred and continues to occur. That is perhaps a tragic inevitably of the conflict. The theory espoused 
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The application of these criminal law principles regarding threats to the hybrid paradigm 
explicitly rejects the views espoused in the Bybee memos.253 This rejection is the essence of the 
theory proposed here. Mild threats, such as those implicit in any interrogation setting itself or 
those that merely notify the defendant of the possible consequences awaiting him, are easily 
considered within the constitutionally permissible aspects of the criminal law paradigm.  But, 
that only satisfies stage one of the threat analysis.  After determining that a threat was on its face 
permissible, the next test is whether the resulting confession was voluntary.254 If held to be 
involuntary in response to a threat, then the confession is inadmissible. Supreme Court precedent 
has unequivocally instructed law enforcement officials regarding the “limits of power” with 
respect to threats.  In extrapolating from the criminal law paradigm, I suggest that the same test 
applies to the hybrid paradigm. 
 
VIII. Cumulative Mistreatment 
While courts and scholars have discussed and defined “threats” in the context of the 
interrogation setting, the same cannot be said for “cumulative mistreatment.”  Therefore, to begin 
it must be established what such a term means in the criminal law paradigm.255 
“Cumulative mistreatment” should be defined as occurring when law enforcement 
officials either hold a detainee for an extended period of time, subject him to seemingly endless 
interrogations, or where a suspect is deprived of basic needs for a significant period of time.256 
in this article is that ultimately our sense of morality must be the true guide in assisting us determine the “limits of 
power” and unlawful threats are just that, unlawful.  
253 See infra at note 4. 
254 See infra at Sect. V(c) for a discussion of voluntariness. 
255 Much like with the definition of threats above, the following definition represents my effort to synthesize the 
efforts of others, scholars, courts, policy makers and interrogators alike. In addition, it reflects my professional 
experience.  
256 One pointed example of cumulative mistreatment, solitary confinement, raises issues of the Eighth 
Amendment.  How, then, do these standards apply to the discussion of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and inhuman punishment?  Although such discussion is typically confined only to the post-conviction world, a 
setting basically inapplicable to this paper’s discussion of interrogation, there is connection to be made to the times 
where acts/punishments made prior to conviction raise the Eighth Amendment. 
The primary example of the application of the Eighth Amendment to the pre-conviction setting is through solitary 
confinement.  The typical focus on such analysis is the psychological effect that solitary confinement has on the 
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Thus, a more refined definition of “cumulative mistreatment” for this discussion will be any 
“prolonged interrogation incorporating illegal methods resulting in an involuntary confession.”  
In short, cumulative mistreatment should be found through a case by case analysis where the 
court looks to determine whether the continuousness and cumulativeness was the specific factor 
which broke down a detainee’s will. 
 
a) Voluntariness is Again the Standard  
In determining the limits of interrogations, the need to ensure a voluntary confession is 
once again the standard where cumulative mistreatment will result in the inadmissibility of the 
confession for concern of involuntariness.257 
In order to offer one example beyond the Deep South that satisfies the above definition, 
the facts in McNabb v US 258 are illustrative.  In McNabb, the defendants were questioned while 
in custody before appearing in front of a magistrate, in violation of the law at the time.  Rather, 
 
detainee.  It can be used, just as cumulative mistreatment, as a way to break a detainee’s will, leading to a confession 
which may in fact be coerced and false.  The Court in In Re Medley, 134 U.S. 161 (1890), through dicta, discussed 
the particularly horrific conditions historically attributed to solitary confinement: “The peculiarities of this system 
were the complete isolation of the prisoner from all human society, and his confinement in a cell of considerable 
size, so arranged that he had no direct intercourse with or sight of any human being, and no employment or 
instruction. . . . But experience demonstrated that there were serious objections to it. A considerable number of the 
prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to 
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal 
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any 
subsequent service to the community. It became evident some changes must be made in the system . . . .” 
The Court’s decision, then, in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), was the first Supreme Court case to apply 
the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause to deprivations not specifically part of a prisoner’s 
sentence. In Estelle, the plaintiff claimed that he received inadequate medical treatment from prison personnel after 
sustaining an injury.” “Failure to do so may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering death,’ which the Eighth 
Amendment originally prohibited.”  The Court stated that “[t]he infliction of such unnecessary suffering is 
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation.” 
Lastly, in Rhodes v Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), the Court added a “totality of the circumstances” test 
regarding conditions in solitary confinement.  The Court announced that “[c]onditions . . . alone or in combination, 
may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”  The Rhodes Court, however, noted that 
the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and therefore, provided great deference to the legislature and 
prison officials in allowing them to determine and implement effective measures of prison reform.” 
Although many discussion of solitary confinement and the Eighth Amendment center on a post-conviction 
analysis, the standards there set are directly applicable to the discussion of this article.  If solitary confinement is 
held to be psychologically damaging to the inmate, then it can be extrapolated that an interrogator who moves a 
detainee into solitary confinement is inflicting the same psychological impact on the pre-conviction individual.  
257 Such as the actions in Ashcraft which lead to the reversal of a conviction. 
258 McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
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the arresting officers were required to take the defendants before the nearest judicial officer for 
an initial hearing.  The officers, however, subjected the defendants to pressure under a system 
incompatible with the law for an extended period of time.  Despite the fact that such actions may 
have been acceptable, or at least excusable, if only carried out over a short time, the lengthy 
amount of time casts a shadow of doubt in this case.  Specifically: 
 
Throughout the questioning, most of which was done by Taylor, at least 
six officers were present. At no time during its course was a lawyer or 
any relative or friend of the defendants present. Taylor began by telling 
‘each of them before they were questioned that we were Government 
officers, what we were investigating, and advised them that they did not 
have to make a statement, that they need not fear force, and that any 
statement made by them would be used against them, and that they need 
not answer any questions asked unless they desired to do so.259 
b) McNabb as Applied to Detainees 
Much like the Court finding the treatment of the defendants in McNabb unconstitutional, 
similar treatment in the detainee interrogation context is also unconstitutional.  Thus, I once 
again propose the use of the “voluntariness test,” as articulated by the Court260 and as analyzed 
and commented on by scholars,261 as appropriate to the hybrid paradigm regarding cumulative 
mistreatment.  The Supreme Court’s ruling in McNabb is on-point for the detainees as it serves 
as an example of what to do with tainted evidence: 
 
Quite apart from the Constitution, therefore, we are constrained to hold 
that the evidence elicited from the petitioners in the circumstances 
disclosed here must be excluded. For in their treatment of the petitioners 
the arresting officers assumed functions which Congress has explicitly 
denied them. They subjected the accused to the pressures of a procedure 
which is wholly incompatible with the vital but very restricted duties of 
the investigating and arresting officers of the Government and which 
 
259 Id. at 336. 
260 “While the connotation of voluntary is indefinite, it affords an understandable label under which can be readily 
classified the various acts of terrorism, promises, trickery and threats which have led this and other courts to refuse 
admission as evidence to confessions.”  Id. at 348. 
261 See Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal 
Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601 (2006); Kimberly Burke, Circumstances of a Voluntary Confession, 25 J. JUV.
L. 84 (2005); and Rutledge, supra note 32.  
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tends to undermine the integrity of the criminal proceeding. Congress has 
explicitly commanded that ‘It shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, 
or other officer, who may arrest a person charged with any crime or 
offense, to take the defendant before the nearest United States 
commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under 
existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial.262 
Justice Reed’s dissent is reflective of an approach that history has shown to be highly 
problematic: 
 
I find myself unable to agree with the opinion of the Court in this case. 
An officer of the United States was killed while in the performance of his 
duties. From the circumstances detailed in the Court's opinion, there was 
obvious reason to suspect that the petitioners here were implicated in 
firing the fatal shot from the dark. The arrests followed. As the guilty 
parties were known only to the McNabbs who took part in the assault at 
the burying ground, it was natural and proper that the officers would 
question them as to their actions.263 
The adoption of Justice Reed’s dissent would allow for “exceptions,” “special 
circumstances” and “exigency.”  As made clear by both the Court in Hamdan and the 
Administration’s later decision to recognize that the detainees are entitled to Geneva Convention 
protections,264 “exceptions” developed in the immediate aftermath of an event are ultimately 
nullified. Justice Reed’s dissent would have contributed to law enforcement allowing itself 
judicially sanctioned excess in response to a particular event. Clearly delineated rules allow no 
opportunity for such excess, whether in the criminal law paradigm or the hybrid paradigm. 
 
A further example similar to McNabb is Upshaw v US.265 In Upshaw, the Court ruled a 
suspect’s confession inadmissible after law enforcement officials again failed to comply with 
criminal procedure rules by not bringing the suspect before a magistrate within the requisite 
time: 
262 McNabb at 342. 
263 Id. at 347. 
264 As noted in the recent memorandum written to Department of Defense officials by Deputy Secretary of 
Defense England: “you will ensure that all DoD personnel adhere to these standards.  In this regard, I request that 
you promptly review all relevant directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures under your purview to 
ensure that they comply with the standards of Common Article 3.” 
265 Upshaw v. U.S., 335 U.S. 410 (1948). 
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Where confessions were made during a thirty hour period while accused 
was held a prisoner after police had arrested him on suspicion and without 
a warrant and the delay was for the purpose of furnishing an opportunity 
for further interrogation, the confessions were inadmissible.266 
The petitioner in Upshaw was convicted of larceny based on a confession which he 
argued was coerced.267 His confession was made at the end of a 30-hour period where the 
petitioner was held in prison without any charges or a warrant.268 
The Court has further discussed this in Anderson v US:269 
While the petitioners, with at least thirteen others, were thus held in 
custody at the Y.M.C.A. by the state officers, they were questioned by the 
federal agents intermittently over a period of six days during which they 
saw neither friends, relatives, nor counsel. Incriminating statements from 
six of the petitioners were the fruit of this interrogation. 
 
The question for decision is whether these confessions-repudiated when 
those who made them took the witness stand at the trial-were properly 
admitted in evidence against all the petitioners, including Anderson and 
Ellis who did not confess. In the McNabb case we have held, that 
incriminating statements obtained under the circumstances set forth in 
that opinion cannot be made the basis of convictions in the federal courts. 
The considerations which led to that decision also govern this case. The 
detention of the petitioners by state officers was, as the Government 
concedes, in violation of the Tennessee statute which provides that ‘No 
person can be committed to prison for any criminal matter, until 
examination thereof be first had before some magistrate.’270 
As both Upshaw and McNabb indicate, an examination of whether a detainee’s 
interrogation is tantamount to cumulative mistreatment is viewed under a broad totality standard 
for whether such treatment overcame their will.271 Now that we have a definition and Court 
 
266 Id. at 411. 
267 Id. at 410. 
268 Id. 
269 Anderson v. U.S., 318 U.S. 350 (1943). 
270 Id. at 355. 
271 While human rights groups and others responded to the quoted and cited statements and documents as 
indicative of the Administration's sanctioning of torture, the cumulative effect of the methods authorized is, in 
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explanation for cumulative mistreatment, the question becomes whether the actions inside 
interrogation rooms in the “war on terror” violate this standard.   
 
As discussions earlier in this article indicated, there are many aspects of current detainee 
interrogation that violate the established rules of both threats and cumulative mistreatment.  As 
Amnesty International has indicated, the “[t]he very conditions in which the detainees are held - 
harsh, isolating and indefinite - can in themselves amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.”  The report goes on to assert that interrogation teams employ such tactics 
by having access to the medical files of the detainees, which give away many weaknesses of 
individual detainees.  Then the interrogator’s power is asserted through lengthy, and cumulative, 
use of sleep deprivation, stress positions, isolation, hooding, sensory deprivation, and the use of 
dogs to induce fear.272 
c) Cumulative Mistreatment: Just as Violative of Rights as are Threats 
Before reaching the concluding recommendations of this discussion, it is worth noting 
that, on its surface, cumulative mistreatment may not come across to be as damaging as the more 
easily defined and understood physical threats.  The Supreme Court, though, has held that 
cumulative mistreatment is as violative of a defendant’s constitutional rights as threats.273 The 
holding of a defendant for a number of days prior to bringing him before a judge,274 the repeated 
transfer of an African-American suspect from county to county without sleep,275 the holding of a 
suspect in a hotel for a number of days for the purposes of intermittent interrogation,276 the 
 
essence, cumulative mistreatment.  The specific acts, in and of themselves as analyzed in Sect. VI(b), fall under the 
definition of torture as defined by international law which the Administration now concedes is applicable. What is of 
interest in this section is the sum total of a particular interrogation; not only a specific waterboarding imposed on a 
detainee but whether that detainee's entire interrogation (as compared to a single act) was reflective of coercive 
interrogation based on cumulative mistreatment resulting in an admissible confession. The analysis in this section, 
accordingly, is of the interrogation in the “overall” rather of a particular act during the course of an interrogation. 
272 Guantanamo: An Icon of Lawlessness, Amnesty International, January 6, 2005.  Available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510022005 (last accessed February 7, 2007). 
273 See infra at Sect. VII. 
274 McNabb at 334. 
275 Ward at 548-549. 
276 Zing Sung Wan v US, 266 U.S. 1 (1924). 
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continued whipping of the African American suspect in the woods,277 and the beatings imposed 
on a suspect over the course of a number of days278 are all illustrative of cumulative mistreatment 
as defined in this article. 
These cases are the criminal law version of what Amnesty International and other human 
rights groups have argued is the reality of Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and Bagram. The 
hybrid paradigm cannot tolerate cumulative mistreatment, just as it cannot tolerate threats. 
 
The 5th and 14th amendments, as analyzed by the Supreme Court in the series of cases 
examined earlier, “speak” loudly. The right to not incriminate oneself and the right to due 
process in the criminal law paradigm have been affirmed and re-affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
Threats, as the Court has made clear, violate both of those seminal amendments in the context of 
the interrogation room. As I have argued, that principle must be extended beyond Montgomery, 
Alabama to the detainee interrogation room. 
 
IX. Recommendations 
In understanding the discussion thus far, it must be noted that this analysis is not intended 
to be a defense for the detainee.279 Rather, the fundamental concerns are two-fold: 1) protecting 
the interrogator from his own government and 2) ensuring that constitutional guarantees are 
honored.  Specifically, unrestrained coercive interrogation and torture comport with neither civil 
 
277 White at 532. 
278 Brown at 280. 
279 Over the course of a 19 year career in the Israel Defense Forces, Judge Advocate General Corps I prosecuted , 
sat in judgment of,  recommended the imposition of a wide range of administrative sanction against and was 
consulted on extraordinarily difficult and complex issues pertaining to Palestinians accused  of having committed 
acts of terrorism against Israelis and Palestinians alike. I add this only to ensure the reader that the basis for a 
concern regarding the detainee is not a result of “softness” nor misplaced innocence. Not in the least nor could I be 
accused of that. Rather, the philosophical underpinnings of this concern are based precisely on my highly relevant 
professional experiences in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere  and my well developed understanding of  
how the best intentioned, most highly trained "best of the best" can, under stress, commit egregious errors. I write 
these words out of the deepest respect for those who have committed their professional career, personal risk, to 
protect society.  I have developed enormous respect for these individuals; many whom society would never 
recognize for their identities must remain confidential. Therefore, I am so profoundly concerned, both personally 
and professionally, when policy recommendations are jurisprudentially based and not reflective of “life on the 
ground” as I (and others) have seen it. 
Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot? 
66
society nor the international community.  Thus, the requisite next step for the United States 
government is the establishment of clearly delineated rules for coercive interrogation.  It must be 
acknowledged that the establishment of strict standards may in fact lead to a more difficult 
eradication of terrorism.  If such standards do cause the executive to be unable to act with 
unfettered discretion, it follows that the recommendations contained herein may lead to the death 
of more innocent people.  However, the interests of operating within civil society require that the 
United States engage in the requisite balance between the interests of national security and the 
equally valid interests of an individual in personal autonomy rather than erring wholly on the 
side of governmental interests with no consideration of the costs. 
 
The government has many different places to look for lessons on how to respond to the 
need to establish standards and guidelines for interrogations.  Although the present discussion 
has focused on the domestic rules and lessons, there are international standards that also provide 
important considerations.280 From the domestic standpoint, though, the government can learn 
from the criminal law paradigm because of the extensive procedures already established for 
interrogations, as well as the historical treatment of African-Americans in the Deep South. 
 
280 The best starting point for understanding the international law framework, under which all acts in the 
interrogation setting must fall is the 1984 Torture Convention.  As its name indicates, this Convention prohibits the 
signatory parties from using any torturous acts against a detainee.  This standard, though, should come as no 
surprise, and does not directly impact the discussion of this article, which has already articulated the assumption that 
torture is improper.  Prior to the 1984 Convention, though, broader language already existed in international law.  
Pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 
The lack of understanding of what would meet the standard of torture, or inhuman, treatment was cured through 
the definition provided in the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment: “The term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.”  G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, 
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988). 
Further, the European community has dealt with questions of line-drawing in coercive interrogation through 
Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which indicates that “no person shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment.”  The European Human Rights Court was 
created to enforce this standard, and first did so in the case of Ireland v UK, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 96 (1976). In this case, 
the Irish government complained about British interrogation techniques which included hooding, noise, standing 
against a wall, and sleep deprivation.  The Court held that the techniques used constituted inhuman and degrading 
treatment, but did not give rise to “torture.”  The Court expounded on this holding, by explaining that torture is 
merely inhuman and degrading conduct carried out to the extreme.  Thus, the Court appears to indicate that the line, 
or standard, is short of “torture,” as the lesser versions, inhuman and degrading, are themselves impermissible. 
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This hybrid model comprised of melding aspects from both the criminal law and POW 
paradigms and applying it to the current detainees, based on a historical analogy, provides a 
unique opportunity to formulate concrete policy recommendations—rooted in the law—to 
decision makers. 
 
The recommendations outlined below are premised on a number of assumptions 
articulated throughout this article:  
 
Recommendation 1: Detainees, even if not American citizens, are to be granted basic 
constitutional protections;  
 
Recommendation 2: torture as an interrogation method is illegal and the so-called 
"ticking time bomb" exception is not to be condoned and not to be adopted;  
 
Recommendation 3: the “void for vagueness” doctrine is applicable in determining the 
limits of coercive interrogation whereas the instituted policy must be clear and particular 
in its standards;  
 
Recommendation 4: both the spirit and the law of Hamdan are to be applied when 
determining the limits of interrogation;  
 
Recommendation 5: the Bram-Brown progeny, as developed in this article, articulates 
clear guidelines with respect to the limits of interrogation where neither coercive 
interrogation nor cumulative mistreatment can be permitted to exist;  
 
Recommendation 6: the process of extending constitutional guarantees to the detainees 
can draw from the Supreme Court's response to the African American experience in the 
Deep South, and the ensuing extension of constitutional rights; 
 
Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot? 
68
Recommendation 7: coercive interrogation parameters must be clearly established to 
specifically articulate what methods are acceptable, and the acceptable measures should 
be limited to a) the use of uncomfortable chairs, b) room temperature modification, c) 
sleep deprivation, d) loud music, and e) the use of hoods; 
 
Recommendation 8: interrogation of detainees without protecting the detainees’ rights 
with respect to self-incrimination and due process violates the Constitution; and 
 
Recommendation 9: the United States Supreme Court must engage in active judicial 
review of an otherwise unfettered executive regarding the interrogation methods used. 
 
As has been suggested throughout this article, clear and unequivocal guidelines and 
standards must be provided to interrogators. To do otherwise is a disservice to the interrogators 
and may result in unconstitutional interrogations. Recommending that amorphous instructions be 
adopted is as unviable as authorizing torture.  The Deep South story with respect to constitutional 
protections for minorities is an unhappy one and the treatment of African-Americans in the 
interrogation setting is a prime example. 
 
From the Bram-Brown progeny we must apply the following with respect to the 
detainees: the 5th and 14th amendments are to be fully extended to the detainees; coercive 
interrogation in the hybrid paradigm will not exceed the limits of  interrogations in the criminal 
law paradigm though detainees need not be Mirandized in the “zone of combat” and need not be 
guaranteed the same rights at trial; clearly written instructions must be provided to the 
interrogators for American interrogation history is replete with excess; and threats and 
cumulative mistreatment most effectively illustrate the limits of interrogation. 
 
In order to avoid the mistakes of the past, we need to learn from the relevant lessons that 
history provides. The interrogation cells of the Deep South are applicable to the interrogation 
cells of Guantanamo Bay. An analysis of the Bram-Brown progeny provides the most effective 
lesson that history can provide for the armed conflict in which America presently finds herself. 
 
